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1 Introduction
Market microstructure is concerned with the institutional set-up of an exchange and
recognises that this design of trading mechanisms affects asset prices. Market frictions
such as information asymmetries or transaction costs are taken into account, thereby
extending the neoclassical asset pricing model but still assuming that investors pro-
cess information rationally and thus make rational investment decisions. Information
asymmetries do not only influence asset prices but also affect trading volume, trade
size, and the timing of trades. As a result, the order flow potentially contains infor-
mation about future stock prices. However, since the early 1980s, empirical results
for financial markets have been documented that are inconsistent with the market ef-
ficiency hypothesis or a fully rational asset pricing model. Among the most prominent
of such anomalies are the Monday and the January effects.1 In this thesis, individual
investors are separated from institutional traders by applying findings from the market
microstructure literature. Specifically, the effects of information asymmetries between
these two investor groups on order flow and asset pricing are investigated. Furthermore,
the presence of a few aspects of potentially irrational trading behaviour, in particular
exhibited by individuals, is tested empirically.
This thesis starts with an investigation of two trading platforms at the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange from the traders’ perspective. Specifically, the second chapter con-
tributes to the debate about the relative qualities of floor and electronic trading sys-
tems by analysing the effects of bringing forward the Xetra closing time from 8.00pm
to 5.30pm in November 2003, while the Frankfurt floor remains open until 8.00pm.
This natural experiment lends itself to an investigation of the trading quality on both
platforms for the same stocks in the same country before and after the event. It is
hypothesised that anonymous electronic trading systems provide less favourable condi-
tions for investors than the non-anonymous floor due to higher adverse selection costs
in the anonymous system. In fact, the empirical evidence implies that investors remain
with Xetra for informed trading. It can be concluded that a trading platform should
be non-anonymous in order to avert informed trading. This finding casts doubt on the
1Recent empirical studies find these anomalies to have fully disappeared or weakened (Schwert
(2003), Rubinstein (2001), Connolly (1989), Marquering et al. (2006), Steeley (2001), Sullivan et al.
(2001), Szakmary and Kiefer (2004)). Since these studies focus on developed financial markets, their
results are not necessarily applicable to the Polish stock and futures markets.
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justifiability of abolishing floor trading systems. If the floor has already been closed,
the remaining electronic exchange benefits from a broker-facilitated upstairs market.
In the next step, individual investors’ trading behaviour is examined on the Polish
stock market. Individuals are separated from institutions by using data from two
trading mechanisms with vastly different investor structures: continuous trading and a
call auction system. Well-informed institutional investors prefer the continuous trading
platform over the periodic auction, since the larger trading volume in the continuous
system offers greater market depth, lower price impact, immediate trade execution,
and larger profits from private information. Likewise, individuals are likely to choose a
batch market over continuous trading, since in the former liquidity is concentrated and
adverse selection costs are small. While most existing studies focus on institutional
investors’ trading in developed markets, chapter 3 of this thesis tests for the presence
of herding during market up- and down-swings on an emerging market. The empirical
results suggest that individuals engage in herding during market downswings, while
there is no evidence of imitating trading behaviour in bullish markets. Regardless of
the state of the market, institutions’ trading behaviour does not appear to exhibit herd
behaviour.
Investigating the existence of anomalies on the Polish WIG20 index futures market
yields further insights about individual investors’ trading behaviour since they dom-
inate this market. In chapter 4, the presence of Monday and January anomalies is
tested, which both are well established in the literature and are at least partially at-
tributed to individual investors’ trading activities. While earlier studies of financial
market anomalies refer to regularities in returns, more recent publications include a
broader range of variables when testing for anomalies. In the context of the Polish
futures market, these are trading volume, open interest, returns, and return volatility.
Furthermore, with the intraday dataset, inference about the time of the day driving
potential anomalies is possible. No evidence of the Monday effect is detected. Turn-
ing to a calendar month anomaly, a significantly low trading volume in the expiration
months March, June, September, and December is observed. This apparent quarter-
end month anomaly can be fully explained by the delivery cycle. It can be concluded
that the contribution of individuals to market anomalies is rather overstated in the
literature. Hence, individual investors’ trading on the Polish futures market surpasses
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the prediction by the majority of investigations for mature stock markets.
Chapter 5 links the Polish stock and derivatives markets by examining the impact
of the introduction of derivatives trading on the conditional volatility of the underlying
instruments. The theoretical argument about this impact hinges upon the degree of
information of spot traders relative to the arriving futures and options traders. If the
debut of futures or options has a stabilising effect on the corresponding cash markets,
this is indicative of well informed traders on the derivatives market. Overall, the
empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of derivatives trading had a stabilising
effect on the stock market. In light of the unique investor structure on the Polish
derivatives market, which is dominated by individuals, we conclude that individuals
entering the derivatives market are better informed than the literature on individual
investors’ trading behaviour suggests.
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2 Forestalling Floor Closure: Evidence from a Nat-
ural Experiment on the German Stock Market
2.1 Introduction
On 3 November 2003, the closing time of the German electronic trading platform Xetra
was brought forward from 8.00pm to 5.30pm, while the Frankfurt floor remained open
until 8.00pm. Deutsche Boerse announced this change in opening hours in a press
release on 3 September 2003. This release claims that market participants prefer uni-
form trading hours across Europe as stock trading becomes increasingly international
(Deutsche Boerse (2003)).
We analyse the effects of this event on the trading qualities on both platforms,
thereby overcoming the limitations of Venkataraman (2001) as pointed out by Mad-
havan (2001). Venkataraman (2001) analyses the trade execution costs for the non-
anonymous New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) compared with the anonymous Paris
Bourse for large and liquid stocks. He finds trading costs in Paris to be higher than at
the NYSE by 0.14 percent of the trading volume and concludes that human interme-
diation may increase liquidity on a stock exchange. In a critical discussion, Madhavan
(2001) demonstrates several substantial difficulties with this analysis: Venkataraman
(2001) examines two stock exchanges in different countries with different regulatory set-
tings and different sets of stocks that are matched using various algorithms. Moreover,
two auction markets are investigated which makes the interpretation of the spreads
ambiguous. As we compare the same stocks traded simultaneously on both platforms
in continuous trading at the same stock exchange, we are able to report more reliable
results than Venkataraman (2001).
Moreover, our direct comparison of the electronic trading system with the floor
provides further evidence regarding the Seppi (1990) hypothesis that broker-facilitated
upstairs markets are preferred to electronic downstairs markets by those traders who
can credibly convey that their trades are uninformed. Bessembinder and Venkatara-
man (2004) find empirical evidence supporting Seppi (1990) and report total execution
costs, and their adverse selection component, to be lower in the upstairs market than
downstairs. They argue that the presence of brokers drives down transaction costs in
part because these brokers have information about unexpressed liquidity (Grossman
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(1992)), and in part because the information asymmetry is lower in a non-anonymous
market. Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) conclude that an electronic exchange
needs an upstairs market.
By presenting empirical evidence on the comparison of two trading systems in a
clean institutional setting, we also contribute to the more general debate on whether
anonymous electronic trading systems provide more or less favourable conditions for
investors than the non-anonymous floor. While a few studies find evidence for the elec-
tronic system offering lower execution costs than the floor (Pirrong (1996), Domowitz
and Steil (1999)), the majority of authors argue that higher information asymmetries in
computerised trading lead to higher transaction costs (Venkataraman (2001), Theissen
(2002), Barclay et al. (2003), Jain et al. (2006)).
Previous studies either compare floor and electronic trading platforms at the same
time (Venkataraman (2001), Grammig et al. (2001), Theissen (2002)), or they investi-
gate how the market properties change over time when an electronic system is intro-
duced instead of the existing trading floor (Gilbert and Rijken (2006)). In our study,
this is reversed in that part of the trading time in the electronic system is abolished.
This reversal is intriguing in itself as one might expect the traditional floor trading
to be more prone to cuts in opening hours than highly automated electronic trading
platforms. Moreover, this setting provides a natural experiment to study potential
transfers of investors from Xetra to the floor as it enables us to examine continuous
trading of the same stocks in two trading mechanisms at the same stock exchange.
Generally, the higher the information asymmetry is, the less liquid and less deep a
market. While traders on the floor have better knowledge about the order flow and the
identity of their trading counterparties, those who trade on a computerised system have
easier access to fundamental information and prices on other markets (Pirrong (1996)).
Pirrong compares theoretically and empirically the liquidity of German Bund Futures
contracts traded simultaneously on the open-outcry platform LIFFE and electronically
on Deutsche Terminboerse DTB. He finds that the computerised system offers lower
spreads and is more liquid and deeper than the floor system.
Domowitz and Steil (1999) examine the total execution costs on various U.S. trading
platforms and hypothesise that electronic trading systems compete for traders with
floor-based ones. The degree of automation and the resulting lower running costs of
11
a computerised platform should lead to lower overall execution costs in an electronic
system than the floor can offer. In fact, they find that electronic markets provide more
favourable conditions to investors than the floor for trading in over-the-counter stocks.
As for trading listed issues, commissions for traditional brokers are so high that they
over-compensate the lower implicit execution costs on the floor.
In contrast to these studies, there is evidence for the floor offering lower execu-
tion costs and hence more favourable conditions for investors than electronic trading
systems. Theissen (2002) compares the transaction costs on the Frankfurt floor with
those in the electronic system (then IBIS, now Xetra) and finds the electronic system
to offer lower bid-ask spreads for actively traded stocks. The floor, however, offers
more favourable conditions for less frequently traded stocks, with the market share
of less liquid stocks being lower in the electronic system than on the floor. Theissen
attributes the higher execution costs on the electronic platform to the adverse selection
component of the spread.
Several related studies investigate the influence of market makers on information
asymmetry. Jain et al. (2006) examine the price impact for stocks traded parallel in
the electronic system SETS and on the dealer market at the London Stock Exchange.
They find empirical evidence for the computerised trading system to attract relatively
more informed trades than the non-anonymous dealer market. Similarly, Barclay et
al. (2003) conclude for Nasdaq stocks that informed traders prefer electronic systems
over market makers. Benveniste et al. (1992) construct a theoretical model for the
spread whose primary implication is that information asymmetries are lower in a non-
anonymous market. However, Lehmann and Modest (1994) examine empirically the
Tokyo Stock Exchange’s success in providing liquidity without a specialist on the floor
and the electronic system. They conclude that the Tokyo Stock Exchange is a well-
functioning, liquid market despite the lack of market makers. Ding and Lau (2001)
investigate how the Stock Exchange of Singapore - which includes a screen-based dealer
system that has no specialist - performs relative to the NYSE and Nasdaq. They find,
to a large extent, similarities between the Singapore Stock Exchange and the NYSE
and Nasdaq.
Bringing forward the closing time of Xetra is not an endogenous variable (Deutsche
Boerse (2003)) and therefore provides an ideal institutional setting to study the extent
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to which investors transfer from Xetra to the floor, and to ascertain the type of investors
that accept trading on a non-anonymous system when the anonymous one closes earlier.
This should yield insights into the perceptions of traders regarding the relative market
qualities of both trading platforms. As investors choose the platform through which to
route their orders, the ’selection bias’ is an integral part of this study and does not need
to be corrected for or explicitly modelled empirically. Since information asymmetry
impacts directly on market quality, we examine whether it is primarily uninformed
investors that accept the floor as a substitute of the electronic system. Theissen (2002)
finds differences in relative execution costs between large and small stocks. This is
consistent with Dennis and Weston (2001), who suggest that institutional investors are
generally better informed than individual ones, and Falkenstein (1996), who concludes
that mutual funds prefer large stocks. We therefore conduct our analysis separately for
large and for small stocks, which might give further indications regarding the type of
investors that transfer to the floor. Finally, we draw conclusions regarding the design
of a trading platform.
We expect trading volume to increase sharply on the floor in November 2003 after
5.30pm, driven by uninformed trades which can thereby be settled at a time when
Xetra is closed. As informed traders prefer the anonymity of the electronic system
(e.g. Barclay et al. (2003)), this might lead, under otherwise equal conditions, to a
higher fraction of informed traders in Xetra, thereby increasing the adverse selection
costs and hence making the computerised platform less favourable for investors. This
might induce further transfers to the floor. Alternatively, it is possible that the fraction
of informed traders increases on the floor if the transferring traders are a representative
subset of all traders in Xetra. If primarily institutional (individual) investors move to
the floor, we expect especially trading volume for large (small) stocks to increase there
in November 2003. If mostly uninformed traders transfer to the floor, we conclude that
a trading platform should be non-anonymous in order to avert informed trading. This
latter finding might shed light on the justifiability of abolishing floor trading systems
from the perspective of market microstructure.
In order to empirically analyse the relative market quality on both trading plat-
forms over time, section 2 introduces the dataset and the methodology before section
3 describes the empirical results. Section 4 summarises our findings and concludes.
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2.2 Data and Methodology
2.2.1 Data
Our dataset captures three months prior to, and after, the bringing forward of the
Xetra closing time on 3 November 2003 from 8.00pm to 5.30pm. This results in 66
trading days from August 2003 to October 2003 and 60 trading days from November
2003 to January 2004. The data comprise transactions and quotes data for 136 shares
traded contemporaneously on both Xetra and the floor. This portfolio captures roughly
90 percent of the equities market in Xetra (Deutsche Boerse (2004)). The transactions
data include timestamp, price, and number of shares. They were obtained from the
University of Karlsruhe database and the quotes data from Deutsche Boerse AG.
The 136 stocks were selected based on the instrument groups set up by Deutsche
Boerse which contain predominantly German companies’ shares. The DAX index com-
prises 30 blue-chip stocks, the MDAX contains 50 stocks whose size ranks immediately
below that of the DAX ones, the TecDAX covers 30 medium-sized stocks in the tech-
nology sector, and the SDAX consists of 50 small-cap stocks. Out of these four indices,
we choose those shares that were traded on both platforms throughout the six months
under investigation.
Quotes are only available for Xetra as this platform has one orderbook from which
we received the data. On the floor, by contrast, several market makers operate who are
not obliged to publish their orderbooks. For this institutional reason, it is impossible
to obtain a comprehensive set of quotes for the floor. Quotes data for Xetra comprise
bid and ask prices with timestamps and the respective number of shares. The rela-
tive spreads, which are reported multiplied with 100, are calculated as the difference
between ask and bid prices divided by the spread midpoint.
We conduct common plausibility checks on the data (Madhavan et al. (1997),
Chung and Van Ness (2001)) and eliminate implausible observations with negative
spreads or with negative or zero trading volume, as well as overnight returns. There
were no entries with changes in absolute spreads, spread midpoints or returns larger
than 50 percent. We only use data from continuous trading, i.e. we exclude auc-
tions and observations outside the trading times. This results in a dataset containing
1,106,147 transactions for the floor, 10,376,549 transactions for Xetra, and 28,165,410
quotes.
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Transactions that market makers settle in their own accounts should also be elimi-
nated since they do not pay spreads to themselves. However, we cannot identify such
transactions in the dataset, and their impact on overall trading volume should be neg-
ligible for large stocks in which institutional investors trade actively. Since our results
are driven by large stocks, we do not pursue this further.
2.2.2 Methodology
In order to analyse the anonymous and the non-anonymous trading platforms over
time, we apply descriptive methods from the market microstructure literature, and we
decompose the bid-ask spreads following George et al. (1991). The methodology of
Venkataraman (2001) cannot be applied here because quotes data are not available
for both markets that we are comparing. For the descriptive analysis, we choose the
turnover as a proxy for trading volume, transaction size as an indicator for the presence
of institutional investors, and return volatility (standard deviation as in Madhavan et
al. (1997) or Ding and Lau (2001)) and the relative bid-ask spread (Glosten and
Milgrom (1985)) to reflect information asymmetry. The trading time is split into 15-
minute intervals, and within each interval the average is calculated per share on each
trading day following Abhyankar et al. (1997). Rather than aggregating the shares
into a portfolio, this method preserves the characteristics of each stock in each interval.
Turnover is calculated as the cumulative product of price and number of shares,
transaction size gives the number of shares per trade, and return volatility is computed
cumulatively across each interval with the return being (pt−pt−1)/pt−1.2 The volatility
and the spreads are reported in percent in Table 1. We employ t-tests to determine
whether the means in the indicators have changed significantly over time. Statisti-
cally, this is identical to estimating dummy regressions and t-testing the estimated
coefficients.
As there are no quotes data available for the floor, we estimate the spread following
Roll (1984). Alternatively, transaction costs could be approximated as in Lesmond et
al. (1999). Their results are strongly correlated with those of Roll (1984) so that the
choice of model will have very little impact on the interpretation of the estimates in
our setting. The basis of the spread estimation in Roll (1984) is the autocovariance γT
2For the descriptive analysis, we follow Roll (1984) and do not take the logarithm of the prices.
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of the returns:
SpreadT =
√
(−4)γT , (1)
where T is the last period for which a return observation is available. SpreadT can be
interpreted as the average relative spread since the returns that feed into the estimation
are relative. In case of γT > 0 it is not defined.
George at al. (1991) propose two methods for decomposing the spread into its
order processing and adverse selection cost components. Under the first approach, the
realised return of an individual stock Ri,t = ln(pi,t/pi,t−1) over each 15-minute interval
needs to be purged of its time-varying expected return component that is approximated
by the return of an equal-weighted size-based portfolio Rp to which stock i belongs.
We use the four portfolios DAX, MDAX, TecDAX, and SDAX described in section 2.1.
The regression
Ri,t = α0 + α1Rp,t + ui,t (2)
is used to extract the expected return of stock i. ui,t are the residuals, whose auto-
covariance across 2-hour intervals form the basis of the synthetic spread Spreadcalc,i,t
which is otherwise calculated as in equation (1). In order to decompose the observed
spread into its order processing and adverse selection cost components, we estimate
the regression
Spreadcalc,i,t = β0 + β1Spreadobs,i,t + i,t (3)
where Spreadobs,i,t is the average observed spread across each 2-hour interval. β1 mea-
sures the order processing costs and (1−β1) are the adverse selection costs. While the
constant has to be included in the model specification (George et al. (1991)), it is not
needed to determine the estimated components of the spread. When βˆ1 < 0 then the
adverse selection costs are set to 1. As there are no observed spread data Spreadobs,i,t
available for the floor, we can only decompose the spreads from Xetra.
The starting point of the second method proposed by George et al. (1991) is the
difference between Ri and the logarithm of the bid price return to compute a synthetic
spread Spreadcalc. Roll’s (1984) spread measure as given in equation (1) can only be
used as Spreadcalc if the expected return of a security is constant over time, and if the
adverse selection costs in the market equal zero.
George et al. (1991) test their models with daily and weekly data of stocks traded
on the NYSE and on Nasdaq from 1983 to 1987. Their major result is that adverse
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selection costs are smaller than previously reported in the literature and account for
8 to 13 percent of the observed spread. George et al. (1991) conclude that order
processing costs are the predominant component of the quoted spread.
If the aim of this paper was to directly compare spreads between the two trading
platforms, we would need to report the Roll (1984) measure for Xetra as well. However,
we observe spreads before and after bringing forward the Xetra closing time for each
trading system separately, so that it is not meaningful to analyse an inferior proxy
spread measure (i.e. Roll (1984)) for Xetra when observed spreads are available.
2.3 Empirical Results
We expected a sharp increase in trading volume on the floor in November 2003 after
5.30pm. In fact, turnover almost doubles there in the evening. As can be seen from
Panel A in Table 1, it increases slightly in the daytime but grows from approximately
15,400 Euros in the evening in October to 29,700 Euros at the same time in November.
This increase coincides with bringing forward the closing time in Xetra on 3 November
2003, which we view as empirical evidence for investors transferring to the floor rather
than remaining with the electronic trading platform and trading in the daytime instead.
Table 1 about here
The results of the cross-sectional analysis, which are not reported here in detail
but are available on request, suggest that the sharp growth in trading volume on
the floor is driven by large stocks, while daytime turnover in Xetra for small stocks
increases. This is an indication that primarily institutional investors transfer to the
floor in the evening, while individual investors trading in small stocks remain with the
electronic trading platform and adjust their trading time (see Falkenstein (1996) for
the relationship between the size of stocks and investor type).
In Xetra, the trading volume increases steadily from August 2003 to November
2003, drops in December 2003 and grows strongly in January 2004. This time series
behaviour, along with the fact that only a small fraction of pre-event evening trading
volume in Xetra is visible on the floor post-event, suggests that other factors play a
part in Xetra in addition to bringing forward its closing time.
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Since transactions in Xetra tend to be larger than those settled on the floor, an
increase in transaction size on the floor could be interpreted as further evidence for
investors transferring to the floor when Xetra is closed. As Panel B of Table 1 shows,
the average number of shares traded per transaction on the floor increases significantly
from about 394 to 535 in November 2003 after 5.30pm. On average, transactions in
the evening are then larger than during the daytime. Thus, the substantial increase
in trading volume on the floor is driven by the growth in transaction size, and is
interpreted as further evidence for the increased trading volume originating from Xetra.
Similarly to turnover, transactions in Xetra grow steadily from August 2003 to October
2003, drop in size in November 2003 and resume growing thereafter.
The transaction size on the floor increases substantially for large stocks in November
2003 after 5.30pm, while the transaction size in Xetra grows slowly across the six
months under investigation. We conclude that investors trading in large stocks transfer
to the floor when Xetra closes earlier. As a larger fraction of market participants
in Xetra are informed traders than on the floor (Barclay et al. (2003)), and since
those traders that appear to have transferred tend to be well informed, we expect this
movement of investors to increase information asymmetry on the floor in November
2003. We investigate this by analysing return volatility and the bid-ask spread.
However, the volatility decreased on both trading systems, with the floor showing
a significant reduction in the daytime and in the evening (Panel C, Table 1). Follow-
ing Barclay and Hendershott (2003), we interpret this as a reduction in asymmetric
information on the floor. It therefore appears that the transfer of investors from Xetra
to the floor does not result in higher information asymmetries on the floor. This can
be explained in two ways: Either those investors that are prepared to transfer to the
floor are not informed, or they are informed but the trades they choose to settle on the
floor are not information-based. Either way, this transfer should increase information
asymmetry in Xetra under otherwise equal conditions. Since we are investigating a
dynamic market across six months, holding everything else equal is too restrictive an
assumption. Therefore, we also observe an overall reduction in volatility in Xetra which
could be attributed to a growth in liquidity shown in Panels A and D of Table 1.
The bid-ask spread is another measure of information asymmetry as it contains
a component that compensates the market maker for losses incurred when trading
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against informed investors. The overall spread decreases in both trading systems, with
the reduction being particularly sharp on the floor in the evening in November 2003
(Panel D, Table 1). For actively traded stocks, the decrease in the spread is so large
that the usual pattern of lower spreads in the daytime than in the evening reverses.
Thus, for large stocks, the daytime spread is larger than that in the evening from
November 2003 onwards. The reduction in spreads in Xetra could be driven by the
increase in liquidity or other factors beyond the transfer of trades to the floor.
As explained in section 2.2, the adverse selection component of the spread can be
analysed for Xetra only. Table 2 shows the mean adverse selection costs for the first
version of the spread decomposition according to George et al. (1991). For DAX and
MDAX shares, the adverse selection costs before November 2003 are smaller in the
evening than in the daytime. Thus, the trades that are affected by bringing forward
the closing time of Xetra are informed to a smaller extent than the trades in the
daytime. We therefore expect transfers inside Xetra from the evening to the daytime
to lower adverse selection costs under otherwise equal conditions. Indeed, we observe
minor, though statistically significant reductions in adverse selection costs for large
and medium-size stocks, with the changes for small stocks being insignificant. This
is plausible since small shares are not actively traded in Xetra in the evening, which
implies that they are not much affected by shortening the Xetra trading time. While the
changes are very small, their statistical significance gives an indication of the direction
in which adverse selection costs have changed over time.
In light of the results of the descriptive analysis, one might expect an increase in
adverse selection costs in November 2003, since primarily informed investors appear
to remain with Xetra, while uninformed ones prefer the floor. However, liquidity in
Xetra increased over time, which reduces spreads and adverse selection costs. While
the adverse selection costs for the TecDAX stocks decrease over the six months under
investigation, there is no significant effect at the time when Xetra begins to close earlier.
The level of the adverse selection costs across all four portfolios is suprisingly high.
George et al. (1991) report that only about 10 percent of the spread compensate the
market maker for adverse selection costs, and their results change substantially when
varying interval lengths. However, our results are robust against the choice of interval
length and the decomposition approach as we also followed Roll (1984) and the second
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method presented by George et al. (1991). This discrepancy between our results and
those of George et al. (1991) could be attributed to technical innovations in the past
20 years lowering order processing costs, thereby increasing the fraction of the spread
that is driven by information asymmetries.
Table 2 about here
It should be noted that the German stock market is fragmented from 9.00am to
5.30pm into floor and Xetra trading platforms. After 5.30pm, only the floor exists,
which enables market makers to observe the entire market more easily than in the
daytime. They can therefore learn faster, so that information is incorporated more
promptly into quotes. This will also make floor trading in the evening more attractive
than before November 2003 and might thus account for some of the observed transfers.
For turnover, transaction size, return volatility and spread, large stocks drive the
empirical results. There are at least two possible explanations for this finding. First,
Xetra has a much larger market share in large stocks than in smaller ones. It is
therefore plausible that primarily large stocks are affected by bringing forward the
Xetra closing time, which is what we see reflected in the data. Second, consistent
with this interpretation is Falkenstein’s (1996) result that institutional investors prefer
large stocks over small ones. Therefore it is likely that primarily institutional investors
transferred to the floor in November 2003, but continued to settle informed trades on
the anonymous electronic platform. It can be concluded that non-anonymous trading
platforms offer favourable conditions to uninformed traders, while the anonymity of a
computerised platform is preferred for settling informed trades.
As a robustness check, we conducted our analysis of turnover, transaction size,
volatility, spread and the spread decomposition for each of the six months from August
2003 to January 2004 separately for either trading platform. The results are not re-
ported in detail but are available from the authors on request. The prominent changes
in all these time series occurred in November 2003, which we regard as support for our
attributing those changes to the earlier closing time in Xetra.
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2.4 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate about the relative qualities of
floor and electronic trading systems. This issue is investigated in a natural experiment
on the German stock market: The trading hours on the anonymous electronic trading
system Xetra are reduced, while the non-anonymous floor remains open from 9.00am
to 8.00pm. Previous studies either compare both trading platforms operating parallel,
or they examine how the market properties change over time when a computerised
system is introduced to replace the trading floor. Our setting enables us to observe
potential transfers of investors from Xetra to the floor, and it overcomes the limitations
of Venkataraman (2001) as pointed out by Madhavan (2001).
We find empirical evidence for primarily investors trading in liquid shares transfer-
ring to the floor after 5.30pm when Xetra closes early. The transactions they settle
on the floor are, on average, not informed. Our insights are consistent with Barclay
et al. (2003), Jain et al. (2006), Benveniste et al. (1992), and Venkataraman (2001)
who find that informed traders prefer the anonymity of the electronic trading system.
Uninformed investors should choose non-anonymous trading systems, and they should
settle their transactions before 5.30pm. The lack of fragmentation in the German stock
market after 5.30pm from November 2003 onwards further contributes to lower trans-
action costs as market makers learn faster when the entire market can be observed
more easily.
Likewise, if information-based trading is to be reduced, the trading platform should
not be anonymous. This implies the recommendation to stock exchanges to refrain from
closing floor trading even if highly automated electronic systems have lower running
costs than the floor. However, there are exchanges that have completely abolished floor
trading, e.g. Italy. Like Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004), we argue that an
electronic exchange benefits from a broker-facilitated upstairs market, especially if the
floor has already been closed.
There are various alleys for methodological extensions of this paper. Firstly, a model
as in Easley et al. (1996) could be estimated. However, this approach is based on the
assumption that information events occur only outside the trading hours, and the
market maker learns the information throughout the trading day. As a result, splitting
the trading time into 9.00am to 5.30pm and 5.31pm to 8.00pm is not meaningful.
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In light of our empirical results, which underscore the sharp differences on the floor
between daytime and evening, we would not be able to interpret the probabilities of
informed trading with respect to the research questions in this paper.
Secondly, the price impact of a trade could be estimated as in Hasbrouck (1991).
The core of this method is to model the interactions between trades and quotes. As
quotes data are not available for the floor, this can only be estimated for Xetra. Like
with the spread decomposition performed above, this means that results cannot be
compared between the floor and the electronic trading platforms, which is the primary
scope of this paper. Thirdly, the effective spread could be used for the descriptive
analysis and for the spread decomposition separately to the quoted spreads. This
spread measure allows for trade executions within the quoted spread (Venkataraman
(2001)). Once again, this would only be possible for Xetra. Finally, depth is another
indicator of market quality and could also be examined in the context of this paper.
However, Lee et al. (1993) find that spreads are negatively correlated with depth so
that qualitative results regarding the latter can be inferred from our analysis of spreads.
More generally, further empirical research should take into account the explicit
trading costs as well. Fees and commissions that investors face for transactions they
settle on the floor might outweigh the relative benefits of the non-anonymous trading
platform (Domowitz and Steil (1999)). Since institutional investors tend to have their
own dealers on the floor, they might be able to save on those fees. This could be another
reason why we observe primarily institutional investors transferring to the floor.
2.5 Tables
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3 Together We Invest: Individual Investors’ Trad-
ing Behaviour in Poland
3.1 Introduction
There are two paths in the empirical literature investigating herding behaviour. The
first one is broader and examines institutional investors, while the second strand fo-
cusses on individual investors. There is mixed evidence regarding which investor type
exhibits herd behaviour more strongly, since flocking together can be rational or irra-
tional. The primary reasons for rational, or spurious, herding are incentives for fund
managers, shared preferences for particular stocks, and common reactions to the same
news (Griffin et al. (2003)), leading to efficient outcomes (Bikhchandani and Sharma
(2001)). Irrational, or intentional herding, by contrast, refers to trading activities that
simply imitate others’ trading decisions regardless of prior information (Bikhchandani
and Sharma (2001)). Individuals have been shown in the literature to be more prone
to intentional herding behaviour than institutions (Kim and Wei (1999)), while insti-
tutions are more likely to engage in spurious herding (Wermers (1999)). Interestingly,
Tan et al. (2008) find evidence of herding in both market segments and at both stock
exchanges in China, suggesting that the Chinese stock market exhibits herding indepen-
dently of investor structure. This paper contributes empirical evidence on individual
investors’ herding behaviour, and on whether this is exhibited more strongly during
market upswings or downswings. Our unique dataset enables us to test for herding on
two trading platforms which differ in investor structure, thereby gaining insights into
the investor type that is particularly prone to imitating trading behaviour.
The literature offers various definitions and economic explanations for herd be-
haviour. Intentional herding refers to buying or selling the same stocks simultaneously
with other market participants regardless of prior beliefs or information about asset
prices. If this is purely sentiment-driven, then such behaviour results in market prices
failing to reflect fundamental information, with mis-pricing potentially leading to bub-
bles and crashes on financial markets. However, observed flocking together can also
lead to news being incorporated in stock prices faster, for example if traders react
to correlated information (Froot et al. (1992)). Similarly, Lakonishok et al. (1992)
report that institutions’ trading activities have a stabilising effect on stock prices. In
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fact, herding can be rational at a single trader’s level for either individual or institu-
tional investors. Copying others’ trading actions is beneficial for individual investors if
the collective trading behaviour contains more information than one trader alone has
(Banerjee (1992), Welch (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992)), and it can be rational
for institutional investors if a reputation among fund managers is to be maintained
(Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Graham (1999)). Similarly, investors share preferences
for stocks with certain characteristics (Falkenstein (1996)). Collective investments in
such securities are not intentional herding because they do consider prior beliefs.
A more detailed analysis of herding reveals that imitating trading behaviour can
depend on the state of the overall market. In fact, there is growing empirical evidence
that stock traders’ responses to good and bad news are asymmetric (Grinblatt et al.
(1995), Keim and Madhavan (1995)). In particular, McQueen et al. (1996) first docu-
ment that cross-autocorrelation in stock returns is asymmetric in up- and downmarkets.
Likewise, there is mixed empirical evidence on herding in market upswings compared
to downswings. Chang et al. (2000) find herding in Taiwan to be more severe in bull
markets than during bear phases, while there is no difference in herding between these
two states of the markets in the U.S., Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea. Christie
and Huang (1995) report the U.S. stock market to be in accordance with rational asset
pricing models even during periods of market stress. Hwang and Salmon (2004) ex-
amine the relative changes of herding activity over time for the U.S. and South Korea
and find herding to be present in up- and downswings in both markets. Specifically,
they observe a return to fundamentals during market downturns, which they refer to
as ’adverse herd behaviour’.
Institutional investors’ trading decisions are believed to be less biased by behavioural
aspects than those taken by individuals (Barber and Odean (2008), Kamesaka et al.
(2003), Ekholm and Pasternack (2008), Shiller (1984)), so that institutions are, in
general, less prone to intentional herding. However, most of the empirical literature in-
vestigating herding behaviour by institutional investors reports mixed evidence. While
some studies find that institutions hardly exhibit herd behaviour (Lakonishok et al.
(1992), Grinblatt et al. (1995)), others report evidence of institutions flocking together
(Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Dennis and Strickland (2002)). Apparent institutions’ herd-
ing can be attributed to the peer review system that fund managers are subject to, or
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to correlated information flows that these investors follow. As institutional investors
collectively trade on these news, they speed up the incorporation of new information
in asset prices and hence stabilise the market (Wermers (1999), Sias (2002), Jones et
al. (1999), Graham (1999)). Further research shows that herd behaviour differs across
institution types (Lakonishok et al. (1992), Badrinath and Wahal (2002)). Specifically,
pension funds are less likely to herd than other institutions.
On the other hand, research on individual investors’ behaviour discovers that these
traders may engage in spurious herding if they follow the same signals (Shleifer and
Summers (1990)). However, herding due to overreaction to recent news is classified as
intentional herding, which individuals are likely to exhibit. According to Kim and Wei
(1999), who investigate the Korean Stock Exchange, herding behaviour by individuals is
more prominent than for institutions. However, Ekholm and Pasternack (2008) show
Finnish individual investors to be more overconfident than institutions. The higher
the degree of overconfidence, the less likely investors are to rely on others’ behaviour
rather than their own beliefs when making investment decisions. It can therefore be
concluded that Finnish individuals are less prone to herding than institutions. Since
institutional investors prefer large-capitalisation stocks (Falkenstein (1996)), imitating
trading behaviour is particularly prominent in these stocks, for which signals are not
as noisy as for smaller stocks. There is, however, evidence of herding in smaller stocks
(Wermers (1999), Lakonishok et al. (1992)), which could be an indication of herding
behaviour by individual investors. In light of the mixed evidence on individuals’ herd-
ing presented in previous studies, this paper contributes to a better understanding of
this phenomenon. Our unique dataset enables us to conduct the analysis separately
for small stocks concentrated in the auction system, and for large stocks dominating
continuous trading.
The Polish stock market lends itself to an investigation of individuals’ trading activ-
ities for a number of reasons. First and foremost, two quotation systems are operated
in parallel by the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) which enable us to separate insti-
tutional from individual investors. These trading platforms are a single-price auction
which has existed since the exchange was opened on 16 April 1991, and a continuous
trading system, introduced in July 1996. In this continuous system, only large liq-
uid shares were traded, and a minimum trade size applied. As a result, individuals
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are concentrated in the auction system, while institutions prefer continuous trading.
The co-existence of these two trading mechanisms enables us to separate individuals
from institutional investors and to compare the trading behaviour of these investor
groups. Secondly, small local investors played a comparatively important role on the
Polish stock market until large open-end pension funds entered the market in May 1999
as a result of the Polish pension system reform. Thirdly, the Polish stock market is
an emerging market, on which herding is more likely to be observed than on mature
markets due to incomplete information disclosure in emerging markets (Chang et al.
(2000)).
We test for the presence of herding behaviour in the single-price auction, where
individual investors are concentrated, and in continuous trading with mostly institu-
tions. In light of Wermers (1999), Lakonishok et al. (1992), Kim and Wei (1999), and
Chang et al. (2000), we expect to find empirical evidence of Polish individual investors
engaging in herding behaviour. By contrast, should there be no indication of herds,
this would imply that Polish individual investors are as proficient as institutional in-
vestors in mature markets. In addition, we investigate whether herding is exhibited
more strongly during up- or downswings of the market, as Chang et al. (2000) and
Christie and Huang (1995) report contrary findings for this.
In order to give a better understanding of our testing setup, section 2 describes the
institutional background of the Polish stock market and introduces the dataset. Section
3 explains the methodology before section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5
summarises our findings and concludes.
3.2 Trading Systems and Institutional Setting at the Warsaw
Stock Exchange
The organisation of stock trading has been shown in the literature to have a substantial
influence on the behaviour of traders, transaction volume, and stock prices. While
in a continuous trading system the market is cleared at almost all times, in a call
auction orders are batched together. Thus, in the latter system, the market is only
consolidated and cleared at discrete points in time with a specialist determining the
market clearing price. The WSE re-opened in 1991 and initially, stocks were traded in
one auction per week. Subsequently, trading has been extended and from 1994 onwards,
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a daily auction was carried out. In 1996, a continuous trading platform for stocks was
introduced. As a result, all stocks we traded in the call auction and the most liquid
securities were additionally traded in the continuous trading system. In this system,
a minimum trade size applied which amounted to the equivalent of about 3,000 US$
and hence virtually excluded individual investors. With the launch of WARSET on
17 November 2000, liquid stocks were taken out of the auction trading, the minimum
trade size requirement in the continuous trading system was dropped, and specialists
started to provide liquidity in the continuous trading mechanism. This event therefore
ends the period during which stocks were traded parallel in a call auction and a purely
order-driven electronic limit order book system.
Both trading mechanisms at the WSE are order-driven, implying that traders sub-
mit orders without knowing a firm price, which is determined multilaterally in an
auction. These order-driven platforms can be further divided by clearing frequency
into continuous and periodic auctions. In a continuous auction, orders are executed
upon arrival. For periodic auctions, orders are accumulated and executed simultane-
ously at a single market clearing price. By contrast, in a quote-driven dealer market,
the dealers’ profits are generated with the difference between the transaction price
and the expected (fundamental) value of the asset. Competition among dealers drives
down their profits, so that quotes and subsequently transaction prices move towards
their fair values. As information asymmetry goes up, public information signals are
imprecise, and dealers do not successfully learn from the order flow, their expected
profits become negative, and they withdraw from the market. This potential collapse
of trading is a market failure from which auction systems do not suffer. Instead, in a
periodic auction, traders share the risk resulting from information asymmetries among
themselves. In general, this yields lower adverse selection costs in auction systems than
in dealer markets. In order to facilitate the incorporation of new information in prices
and to prevent market failure, many continuous markets open with a call aution in the
morning (Amihud et al. (1990)).
The optimal clearing frequency of a market is determined by the trade-off between
two parts of liquidity risk (Garbade and Silber (1979)). The first part captures the
risk of changes in fair values during the time between the decision to trade is made
and the time the trade is executed. This part of liquidity risk is minimised in a
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continuous trading system. The second part of liquidity risk is caused by transient
random deviations of prices from their fair values due to the fact that prices are set
by a subset of traders. In a continuous system, these subsets are very small, while the
consolidated market in an auction covers the entire market. As a result, the second
part of liquidity risk is minimised in an auction. The larger the price volatility of
a security, and the larger the number of market participants, the higher the optimal
clearing frequency. Moreover, institutional investors hold well-diversified portfolios and
trade often, so that random price fluctuations cancel out in the long run. Individual
investors, by contrast, only trade infrequently and hold less diversified investments,
which are, on balance, adversely affected by random price changes in the continuous
system. Dealer presence reduces the time to trade completion and stabilises prices,
implying that the liquidity risk on a dealer market is lower than on a purely public
market under otherwise equal conditions.
In light of Garbade and Silber (1979), a well-informed, well-diversified institutional
investor will prefer the continuous trading platform over the periodic auction, since
the larger trading volume in the continuous system offers greater market depth (Kyle
(1985)), hence lower price impact, immediate trade execution, and hence larger profits
from private information. Moreover, like in any quote-driven market, the price is known
at the time of order submission, relieving investors of the risk that other contempora-
neous orders unfavourably influence the price. The flip side of this conclusion is the
insight that individuals are likely to choose a batch market over continuous trading, so
that liquidity is concentrated at particular points in time, adverse selection costs are
small, and prices are nearer their fair values. Furthermore, Falkenstein (1996) finds
that institutions prefer large stocks. Consistently with this, Madhavan (1992) reports
that large liquid stocks are generally traded continuously, while smaller stocks dominate
trading in periodic auctions. This distinction between trading systems enables us to
investigate trading behaviour on a platform that institutions tend to prefer compared
with a system that is more favourable towards individuals.
Both trading systems on the WSE have had daily price variation limits of 10% in
place. A transaction price for shares in continuous trading had to lie inside a 10%-
corridor around the opening price, and for shares traded in the auction system the
benchmark value was the previous day’s price. When the stock price hits these limits,
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the specialist broker appointed by the exchange intervenes by trying to balance the
market through buying or selling securities in his own account. If it is impossible to
find the market clearing price in this way, the size of the order imbalance is estimated.
For imbalances between supply and demand of 5:1 and larger, trading is suspended,
and for smaller imbalances the submitted orders are subject to proportional reduction
by the prevailing side of the market (Warsaw Stock Exchange (2000)).
3.3 Methodology and Data
We base our analysis on the mean cross-sectional absolute deviation of individual stock
returns rit from the market average Rm,t at time t (Christie and Huang (1995), Chang
et al. (2000)):
S∗t =
n∑
i=1
|rit −Rm,t|
n
, (4)
where n is the number of stocks in the sample on each day t. The mean absolute
deviation S∗t does not measure the variation in each stock over time, nor does it capture
the dispersion of each individual return from its expected value. Thus, it cannot be
viewed as the portfolio volatility. When herd behaviour is present, investors’ decisions
are driven by the market movements rather than by their own heterogenous beliefs,
and hence individual stock returns are nearer the market average than under a rational
asset pricing model. Among these models are the CAPM (Black (1972)) and the market
timing model proposed by Treynor and Mazuy (1966). Rational asset pricing models
predict differences among stock returns in their sensitivity towards the market return,
resulting in return dispersion S∗t increasing linearly with the absolute value of the
market return. Therefore, Chang et al. (2000) argue that S∗t by itself cannot be used
to detect herding. Rather, the relationship between S∗t and Rm,t should be examined.
In the presence of herding, S∗t increases at a non-linear rate as the absolute market
return increases, because S∗t deviates downwards from the linear relationship. Thus,
in order to detect herding, we estimate the regression
S∗t = α + β1|Rm,t|+ β2R2m,t + t , (5)
where a statistically significantly negative βˆ2 indicates herd behaviour. When βˆ2 is
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insignificant, S∗t increases linearly with the absolute value of the market return, and
we conclude that herding is absent.
This regression analysis is conducted separately for down- and up-markets to detect
potential differences in trading behaviour between these two states of the market. If the
daily market return is positive (negative) on any given day, the market is classified as
an up- (down-) market (Chang et al. (2000), Kurov (2008)). Since the absolute value
of the market return is used in the estimation, βˆ2 can be directly compared between the
down-market and the up-market. We apply an F -test to detect statistically significant
differences in all estimated coefficients between periods of market stress and bullish
phases. Thus, the null hypothesis to test the entire regression line is H0: α
up = αdown
and βup1 = β
down
1 and β
up
2 = β
down
2 , and the test statistic is calculated as
F =
(SSET − SSES)/q
SSES/DFS
(6)
where SSET denotes the sum of squared errors in the regression across all states of the
market, while SSES = SSEup + SSEdown and thus refers to the sum of squared errors
for market upswings and downswings. q is the number of parameters that are being
estimated, whereas DFS equals the total number of observations less the number of
parameters estimated in the regressions for market upturns and downturns. The test
statistic follows an F distribution with q and DFS degrees of freedom.
In order to test H0 : β
up
2 = β
down
2 rather than equality of the entire regression line,
we estimate
S∗t = α + β1|Rm,t|+ β2R2m,t +Dt · (γ0 + γ1|Rm,t|+ γ2R2m,t) + t , (7)
where Dt equals zero in market downswings and takes the value of one otherwise. A
statistically significant γ2 coefficient indicates differences in herding between market
upswings and bear phases. A negative γ2 parameter suggests more prominent herding
during upswings than downswings.
Finally, it can be hypothesised that herding diminishes across the 4-year sample
period. This could be due to smoother information flows on the Polish stock market,
or it could result from investors becoming more experienced and hence less sentiment-
driven, or both. We therefore examine the time series behaviour of herding in both
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trading systems and estimate
|βˆ2t| = ζ0 + ζ1t+ ζ2Dt + t (8)
where βˆ2t is taken from regression (5) which is run for moving windows of 100 trading
days each. t is the time variable, and Dt takes the value of zero if there are more
bear market days than market upswings in any 100-trading-day window and the value
of one otherwise. Dt is included in the model specification because the estimation
results from regression (5) indicate that β2t differs between up- and downmarkets.
A statistically significant and negative ζˆ1 coefficient implies that the market moves
towards the prediction of rational asset pricing models, and hence herding becomes
less prominent in case it was present at the outset. ζˆ2 captures the difference in the
time series behaviour of herding between market up- and downswings. All regressions
are estimated with OLS, and the statistical inference is based on Newey and West
(1987) standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
in the error term.
The WSE provided time series of daily close prices for all traded stocks in each of
the two trading systems from 9 July 1996 to 16 November 2000. This is the period when
stocks were traded parallel in one single-price auction per day and in continuous trading
and yields 1, 088 daily return observations. Christie and Huang (1995) hypothesise that
data frequency might influence whether herding is detected empirically. Moreover,
Lakonishok et al. (1992) argue that herding in individual stocks only shows up in daily
or weekly data. Daily data assume that herding is short-lived, while monthly data
let returns move away from, or cluster around, the market over longer time horizons.
However, Christie and Huang (1995) find no empirical deviation between monthly and
daily data for the New York Stock Exchange. Based on this finding, information does
not appear to be lost when using daily data. We therefore follow Chang et al. (2000)
in conducting the analysis with daily data.
After calculating continuously compounded returns rt = ln(Pt/Pt−1) and account-
ing for stock splits and dividend payments, we obtain 182,861 observations for the call
auction and 70,476 data points for continuous trading. At the beginning of the sample
period, only five stocks were traded per day in the continuous system, while in Novem-
ber 2000, 102 companies were quoted and traded actively in the continuous trading
system. By contrast, the auction was more heavily used with trading in 75 shares per
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day in July 1996 and transactions in 223 shares at the end of the sample period.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of daily returns for both trading platforms. The
individual stocks’ returns are, on average, negative in both systems. Interestingly, even
though the market is consolidated in the call auctions and there are more than twice
as many observations than for continuous trading, the return volatility in the auction
market is larger than in continuous trading and substantially larger than the return
volatilities reported by Chang et al. (2000) for mature markets (e.g. the U.S.) or for
emerging markets (e.g. South Korea or Taiwan) for a 20-year period ending in 1995.
This larger volatility in Poland could be attributed to higher information asymmetries
on this market (Barclay and Hendershott (2003)), potentially driven by the large share
of individual investors. Moreover, individual investors are a less homogeneous group
than institutional investors and are thus less likely to agree on fair asset prices. Con-
sistently with these arguments, we find return volatility in the auction system to be
slighlty larger than in continuous trading, which is preferred by institutional investors.
Table 3 about here
We compute the market return Rm,t in three different ways. First, we use the
performance index WIG as a proxy for the market, which is an all-stocks value-weighted
index. Second, the WIG20 price index captures the 20 large cap stocks; and third, we
calculate equally weighted market portfolios across all shares traded on any one day for
each trading system separately. While the WIG and the WIG20 indexes are observable
for traders, the equally weighted market portfolios are not known to investors. By
calculating S∗t with the equally weighted market portfolio which does not overrepresent
any class of stocks, we measure how far the stocks traded on any given day move away
from their own average return rather than from the overall market. The value-weighted
indexes WIG and WIG20 are dominated by large-cap stocks, whose prices have been
shown to incorporate new information more quickly, leading to a higher information
content of large stocks (Gebka (2008)).
In addition to separating individual investors from institutions by examining two
different trading systems, we distinguish these investor types by market capitalisation
within either trading platform. Thus, we assume that institutional investors prefer
large stocks, while individuals tend to be over-represented in small stocks (Falkenstein
(1996)). Specifically, we create three size portfolios from all stocks traded on any given
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day based on the average market capitalisation of each stock across one month. By
taking the average market capitalisation rather than the daily market capitalisation,
we exclude short-term switches of stocks between two size groups resulting from highly
volatile stock prices. In fact, these price movements should be captured in S∗t , for
which the respective stocks have to remain in the same size portfolio. The small stock
portfolio comprises the smallest third of stocks across one month, the medium size
group includes the next-largest third, with the remaining stocks being allocated to the
large-capitalisation portfolio. Within each portfolio, S∗t is calculated, and regression
(5) is estimated as described above.
3.4 Empirical Results
The primary goal of this paper is to determine whether individual investors on the
Polish stock market engage in herding behaviour. Moreover, we test whether potential
herding is different during market upswings and downswings. Across the four-year
period under investigation, individuals are the dominating trader type at the WSE,
contributing 43% of total turnover value. Furthermore, we distinguish between institu-
tions and individuals by examining two trading platforms separately, and by splitting
the stocks in our sample into three size portfolios. Overall, the empirical evidence
suggests that individual investors’ trading behaviour exhibits herding during market
downswings, while institutions do not engage in flocking together regardless of the
state of the market. Furthermore, herding behaviour appears to have become less
pronounced over time.
Table 4 summarises the results for both trading platforms. A statistically significant
negative βˆ2 indicates herd behaviour. By contrast, when βˆ2 is insignificant, we conclude
that herding is absent. In the single-price auction, there is no herding in market up-
swings, but substantial herding during bear phases. These differences between market
states are highlighted by the F -test and the t-test statistics. While the F -test tests for
equality of the regression lines in up- and downmarkets, the t-test tests specifically for
equal β2-parameters in bull and bear periods. Chang et al. (2000) report significant
herding in South Korea and Taiwan, while mature markets like the U.S. and Hong Kong
do not show evidence of herds. Thus, during bull markets, individuals transacting in
the single-price auction exhibit trading behaviour similar to institutional investors in
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the U.S. or Hong Kong. While Chang et al. (2000) find Taiwanese investors to exhibit
more severe herding behaviour during upswings than downswings, our results suggest
that individuals show herding behaviour during periods of market stress, which is also
contrary to Hwang and Salmon (2004).
However, our findings are consistent with individuals being more overconfident dur-
ing market upswings than downswings (Daniel et al. (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001),
Statman et al. (2006)) as they follow their own assessment in the up markets but tend
to ignore it during the down phases. This could be driven by the market rewarding
behaviour that is based on prior beliefs during upswings, while investors are more likely
to doubt their knowledge during market stress. Alternatively, investors could be reluc-
tant to realise losses as the market goes down (Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Odean
(1998)). Hence, rather than selling stocks when the market return becomes negative,
they continue to hold them, which results in small return dispersion as a downward
pressure on asset prices does not materialise.
Table 4 about here
For continuous trading, however, our results of no herding are in accordance with
those reported by Chang et al. (2000) for mature markets, which are dominated by
institutions and do not exhibit herding. Panel B in Table 4 shows a linear relationship
between S∗t and the market return, with the quadratic term being statistically insignif-
icant. When we use the equal-weighted index of all traded stocks on any given day
as the market, the β2 parameter is statistically significant and positive, implying that
the deviation of individual stock returns from the market is larger than rational asset
pricing models predict. This can be viewed as evidence in favour of investors strongly
relying on their own anaylses rather than information revealed by others’ trading be-
haviour. Overall, this finding can be interpreted as evidence against the existence of
herding among institutional investors regardless of the state of the market, since the
t-test of βup2 = β
down
2 generates insignificant results. This is in accordance with Gebka
et al. (2006) documenting a stabilising effect of institutional investors entering the
Polish stock market.
In the next step, we test whether herding is more pronounced in small stocks than
large ones. For this, we split the stocks within either trading platform into three size
portfolios based on monthly average market capitalisation. Table 5 presents the results
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for the single-price auction, while Table 6 shows those for continuous trading. The
overall evidence for the auction system, where individuals are overrepresented, suggests
that there is significant herding in stocks of all sizes during market downturns, as
indicated by significantly negative βdown2 coefficients. For large stocks, however, we also
find imitating trading patterns during market upswings (βup2 negative and significant),
with herding in downswings being more severe (as indicated by the significant t-test
statistic of H0 : β
up
2 = β
down
2 ). Thus, the insights summarised in Table 4 are confirmed,
while the aggregates shown there hide the peculariaty in large stocks during bullish
market periods. The results presented in Table 5 suggest that individuals trading
in small and medium-sized stocks in the single-price auction refer, during periods of
market stress, to others’ investment decisions rather than their own prior beliefs. This
is contrary to the return to fundamentals during market downswings found in Hwang
and Salmon (2004). Those who trade in large stocks, however, appear to follow the
market regardless of its current state.
Table 5 about here
Table 6 about here
The evidence for continuous trading, which is dominated by institutions, is con-
sistent with Chang et al. (2000) for the U.S. and Hong Kong. In fact, there is no
sign of herd behaviour independent of bullish or bearish market phases and across all
stock sizes (Table 6). While the Polish stock market is an emerging capital market,
its institutional investors’ trading behaviour is similar to that observed in the U.S., as
indicated by insignificant β2 parameters. This suggests that institutions trading in the
continuous system are as advanced as investors on mature markets, and the accuracy
and availability of the information on the Polish stock market are as good as on mature
markets. In light of this insight, the Polish stock market is no more likely to suffer
from mis-pricing and the formation of bubbles than more advanced markets. Moreover,
when the equal-weighted index of all traded stocks represents the market, the herding
parameter β2 is significant and positive in downmarkets. This implies that, during
market stress, institutional investors transacting in the continuous trading system base
their investment decisions mainly on their own beliefs and prior knowledge rather than
on others’ trading behaviour.
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Table 7 summarises the time series behaviour of herding for both trading platforms.
A statistically signifcant and negative ζˆ1 parameter suggests that the market is comply-
ing more fully with rational asset pricing models towards the end of the sample period
than at the outset. In the single-price auction, it appears that herding has become
less pronounced over time except when the WIG20 index represents the market. Since
ζ2 is significant and negative for the WIG as market index, it can be concluded that
this development took place during market upswings rather than downswings. This is
plausible as herding persists in the latter market state which is consistent with the re-
sults presented in Table 4. Thus, during market stress, individuals continue to exhibit
herding behaviour, while they have learnt to trust their own information and beliefs as
the market return rises.
Table 7 about here
In continuous trading, by contrast, we detect no evidence of herding (Table 4)
and hence no significant changes in herding behaviour over time when the WIG or
WIG20 indexes represent the market. When the equal-weighted index of all traded
stocks is used, however, Table 4 reports that individual stock returns are even farther
from the negative market return than rational asset pricing models predict, implying
a cross-sectional return dispersion that is larger than predicted by these models. This
effect has become less pronounced over time, since ζ1 is significant and negative for the
equal-weighted index as market return. ζ2 is significant and positive, implying that this
development took place primarily during market downswings. This is consistent with
the results presented in Table 4, according to which deviations from the predicitions
by rational asset pricing models only occur during market down-phases.
It can be argued that the existence of price limits, as discussed in section 3.2, can
potentially bias our results. However, by investigating close-to-close spot returns rather
than intraday price changes, we largely exclude the potentially decreasing effect of
price variation limits on the cross-sectional deviation of stock returns from the market
return. Moreover, herding implies that individual stock returns cluster around the
market rather than deviating from it. Detecting herding is hence unaffected by price
variation limits.
In essence, the empirical evidence suggests that individual investors transacting
in the single-price auction engage in herding during market downswings, while their
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investment behaviour exhibits no herding during market upswings. This herding be-
haviour has become less pronounced over the sample period. Institutional investors in
the continuous trading system do not show signs of flocking together regardless of the
state of the market. These differences in herding by investor type are contrary to Tan
et al. (2008) who find evidence of herd behaviour for both Chinese individuals and
foreign institutions.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper investigates individual investors’ trading behaviour by testing for the pres-
ence of herding on the Polish stock market from July 1996 to November 2000. In order
to distinguish between individuals and institutions, we examine two trading platforms
separately where stocks can be traded in a single-price call auction and a continuous
system. While the former is dominated by individuals (Madhavan (1992)), institutions
prefer the continuous system (Kyle (1985)). A further mechanism to differentiate be-
tween individuals and institutions is market capitalisation (Falkenstein (1996)). We
therefore conduct the analysis by size portfolio for either trading platform.
The empirical results suggest that individual investors exhibit herding during mar-
ket downswings, while institutions do not engage in flocking together regardless of the
state of the market. This suggests that individuals’ investment decisions are prone to
sentiment during market stress, while they trust their beliefs and information when
stock prices rise. By constrast, we find no evidence of herding among institutional
investors. In fact, Polish institutions trading in the continuous system appear to be as
experienced as investors on mature markets, and the information flows on the Polish
stock market seem as good as on mature markets. Our insights imply for investments
in stocks primarily traded by individuals that a larger number of stocks is necessary
than in a market that is dominated by experienced institutional investors in order
to achieve the same level of diversification (Chang et al. (2000)). In a market with
herding, asset prices are more strongly correlated than in a market without imitating
trading activities. As a result of this raised return correlation, investors need more
stocks for the same level of diversification as in a scenario without herding.
The empirical evidence suggests that the trading patterns differ between individuals
and institutions across the sample period, with individuals being prone to sentiment-
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driven investment decisions when the market return declines. This could be attributed
to the Polish stock market being an emerging capital market throughout the period
under investigation. During more favourable market phases, however, individuals’
trading behaviour results in market outcomes that are consistent with the predictions
of rational asset pricing models. Having identified a tendency towards diminishing
herd behaviour by individuals, and in light of the lack of evidence in favour of herding
among institutions, we conclude that the Polish stock market has become more efficient
throughout the sample period. Trading systems that foster smooth information flows
aid especially individuals in exhibiting investment behaviour that is consistent with
rational asset pricing models.
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Table 7: Regression Results for the time-series behaviour of herding in Poland
|βˆ2t| = ζ0 + ζ1t+ ζ2Dt + t
ζ0 ζ1 ζ2 Adj R
2
Panel A: Single-Price Auction
Rm = RWIG 4.770 −2.263 −1.109 0.114
p-value 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Rm = RWIG20 3.416 0.745 −0.695 0.029
p-value 0.000∗∗∗ 0.158 0.041∗∗
Rm = Requal 7.204 −6.653 0.646 0.289
p-value 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.127
Panel B: Continuous Trading
Rm = RWIG 5.106 −0.814 −1.924 0.088
p-value 0.000∗∗∗ 0.214 0.000∗∗∗
Rm = RWIG20 3.026 1.030 −0.355 0.021
p-value 0.000∗∗∗ 0.134 0.243
Rm = Requal 3.213 −1.559 1.205 0.075
p-value 0.000∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
The coefficients are estimated with OLS, and the p-
values are based on standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to five lags with
the Newey and West (1987) method. ζˆ1 is reported
in thousands. Three different proxies for the market
are used: the performance index WIG, the price in-
dex WIG20, and the equal-weighted index of all stocks
traded on any given day. The regression |βˆ2t| = ζ0+ζ1t+
ζ2Dt + t is estimated for moving windows of 100 trad-
ing days each. Dt takes the value of zero if there are
more bear market days than market upswings in any
100-trading-day window and the value of one otherwise.
βˆ2 is estimated in S
∗
t = α + β1|r¯t| + β2r¯2t + t. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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4 Individual Investors Surpass their Reputation:
Trading Behaviour on the Polish Futures Market
4.1 Introduction
A number of studies analyse investment decisions by individual traders, with the ma-
jority of authors arguing that these investors tend to be uninformed regarding funda-
mentals and therefore exhibit sentiment-driven trading behaviour. Moreover, some of
the evidence suggests that stock market anomalies such as the Monday and January
effects can be at least partly attributed to individual investors. As stock market trans-
actions cannot, in general, be separated into those initiated by individuals and those
originating from institutions, it is difficult to test empirically which investor type is
the driving force behind calendar anomalies. However, the Polish futures market offers
an extraordinary testing ground for analysing individual investors’ trading behaviour,
since the vast majority of trading activity in Polish stock index futures is attributed to
individuals. We investigate the Monday and January effects on the Polish WIG20 stock
index futures market with a comprehensive set of variables covering trading volume,
open interest, return, and return volatility.
On the Polish futures market, two thirds of the trading volume are accounted for
by individual investors, turning them into the predominant trader type. Moreover,
basket securities as underlyings are traded, for which adverse selection costs tend to be
lower than in markets for individual securities (Subrahmanyam (1991)). As low adverse
selection costs are especially attractive for uninformed investors, they tend to prefer
basket securities over individual securities. Thus, the WIG20 futures market is likely
to have an even higher share of individual traders than the overall futures market.
In contrast to individual investors, institutions employ financial analysts that gather
firm-specific and macroeconomic information. As a result, institutions tend to be bet-
ter informed than individuals (Dennis and Weston (2001)) and can exploit economies of
scale in data processing. They therefore prefer stocks that a large amount of informa-
tion is published about (Falkenstein (1996)). These are large, liquid stocks, for which
research on fundamentals is profitable. By contrast, individual investors are generally
employed in activities other than fundamental research and therefore tend to invest
in attention-grabbing stocks (Barber and Odean (2008), Nofsinger (2001)). Moreover,
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individuals’ trading decisions are more biased by behavioural aspects than institutions’
investment strategies, which also contributes to institutions outperforming individuals
(Kamesaka et al. (2003)).
In this study, we focus on two well-established anomalies, the Monday effect and the
January effect. The former refers to the observation that stock returns on Mondays are
statistically significantly lower than on the other days of the week, with Monday returns
often being negative. This anomaly can be explained with the particularly high costs to
individuals of conducting fundamental research on weekdays. Instead, they defer their
investment decisions to the weekend. As a result, individual investors are more active
traders Monday morning than on other days (Abraham and Ikenberry (1994)). At the
same time, institutional investors devote Monday morning to strategically planning the
remaining week, thereby being less active traders than usual (Lakonishok and Maberly
(1990)). Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) argue further that brokers will issue primarily
buy recommendations during the week, while individuals make their sell decisions over
the weekend. The relative weight of individuals’ transactions on Mondays and their
bias towards sell orders are an explanation for the Monday effect being driven by
individuals, which is supported by the empirical evidence of Brooks and Kim (1997).
The second stock market anomaly is the January effect, which describes the phe-
nomenon of significantly high returns for small stocks in January. Dyl and Maberly
(1992) find that it can partly be explained by the tax-loss-selling argument, according
to which individual investors sell poorly performing stocks at the end of the year in
order to deduct the losses from their tax burdens. In January, individuals re-invest in
the same stocks, thereby increasing stock returns. In between these transactions, the
proceeds are parked (Ritter (1988)). The window-dressing hypothesis predicts returns
to move in the same direction, as institutional investors re-balance their portfolios to-
wards the end of the year by selling ’losers’ and buying ’winners’. However, Sias and
Starks (1997) find that primarily individuals cause the January effect.
More recent studies find that the Monday and the January effects have become
weaker or disappeared altogether since these phenomena became widely known. In
particular, Marquering et al. (2006) examine anomalies before and after they were
published. The empirical evidence suggests that both anomalies have vanished in the
U.S. market at the time of the relevant academic publications. Szakmary and Kiefer
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(2004) add the finding that the January effect in the U.S. cash and futures markets
is no longer present after 1993, with the Monday effect having vanished in the U.S.
post 1975 (Connolly (1989)). However, Dubois and Louvet (1996) report evidence of
a persisting Monday effect for West European markets. All of these studies focus on
developed financial markets that are dominated by institutional investors, whereas we
investigate a market with an investor structure vastly different to this. It can therefore
be hypothesised that either anomaly continues to exist on the Polish futures market
where individual investors are the major trader type.
While the studies mentioned above examine the spot market, there is only a limited
number of investigations of the futures market. Among these is Cornell (1985), who
finds no empirical evidence for a day-of-the-week effect for returns of S&P500 index
futures contracts. He therefore concludes that the prices on the futures market are
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, while returns of the S&P500 stock index
exhibit a significant Monday effect. This apparent discrepancy in market efficiency
between the spot and the futures market cannot be explained by the latter offering
lower transactions costs since transactions could be timed such that sells are settled on
Fridays and buys on Mondays without raising transactions costs. Furthermore, positive
errors in prices on Friday could be reversed on Monday, thereby causing the Monday
effect. However, Keim and Stambaugh (1984) show that this measurement error does
not account for the Monday effect because of a high correlation between Friday and
Monday returns.
Chiang and Tapley (1983) test for the presence of a day-of-the-week effect in return,
trading volume, and open interest for commodity futures listed on the Chicago Board
of Trade. While the results differ across contracts, the average return on Mondays
is negative, volume scores the highest percentage change on Tuesdays, whereas open
interest shows no day-of-the-week effect. This insight for the return on the futures
market is consistent with the findings of studies examining the spot market (e.g. French
(1980)). Potential anomalies in the Dow Jones spot and futures commodity indexes
returns are studied in Chang and Kim (1988). They report persistent negative Monday
spot returns, while the day-of-the-week effect in the corresponding futures market has
completely vanished since 1982.
For the variables under scrutiny in this paper, empirical evidence regarding the spot
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market suggests a higher trading volume on Monday mornings than on the other four
days of the week (Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Abraham and Ikenberry (1994)).
Moreover, return volatility can be expected to be higher on Mondays than during the
rest of the week (Foster and Viswanathan (1990)). Harris (1986) finds significantly
negative stock returns arising from the first 45 trading minutes on Monday morning.
In case of a January effect, we expect higher spot returns in January than in the
other eleven months (Keim (1983)). As for futures markets, by contrast, the existing
literature gives rise to the conjecture that neither a Monday nor a January anomaly
exists. In light of Grossman (1977), one might attribute the lack of a Monday effect on
the futures market to the larger fraction of informed institutional investors there than
on the spot market, who have arbitraged away anomalies. This argument does not
hold for the Polish futures market though, since it is dominated by individual traders.
Thus, should the empirical results for the Polish futures market reject the existence of
an anomaly, it can be concluded that Polish individuals’ trading behaviour is far less
sentiment-driven than the literature predicts for developed spot markets.
In order to empirically investigate individuals’ trading behaviour on the Polish
futures market, section 2 describes the institutional design of this market, section 3
introduces the dataset and the methodology, before section 4 presents and interprets
the empirical results. Section 5 summarises our findings and concludes.
4.2 Institutional Background
The first exchange in Warsaw was founded in 1817. Having been closed during World
War II and the communist era, the Polish stock market was re-opened on 16 April
1991. Exactly three years later, the WIG20 stock price index was launched.3 This
index reflects the performance of twenty blue chip stocks listed on the main market of
the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The mWIG40 (until 18 March 2007, MIDWIG),
a mid-cap price index, followed on 21 September 1998, and the TechWIG price index,
representing innovative technogogies, on 31 December 1999. The Polish stock mar-
ket has been growing rapidly in part because formerly state-owned companies were
privatised and listed on the WSE, with the first foreign company (Bank Austria Cred-
3All information about the Warsaw Stock Exchange is taken from the annual fact books. Regulatory
details about shortsales can be obtained from Art.141-142 in the Act of 28 August 1997, ’About the
organization and functioning of pension funds (OFE)’ (Dz.U. 1997 Nr 139 poz. 934 with amendments).
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itanstalt AG) being listed on 14 October 2003. Since 1 May 2004, the exchange’s
market structure has been complying with EU standards, i.e. securities trading has
two segments, the main market and the regulated unofficial parallel market.
Initially, there was a spot market only. Futures contracts on the WIG20 have been
traded at the WSE since 16 January 1998. This was the first derivative product in-
troduced by the exchange, which quickly became very popular among Polish investors.
During 1999, the trading volume in the WIG20 futures market rose over eightfold rel-
ative to the previous year, and in 2000 the growth in turnover was sevenfold compared
to 1999. The number of contracts traded has been growing by 20% per year on average.
In 2005, the trading volume for the stock index futures market at the WSE, measured
as the number of contracts traded, reached 5.2 millions. This compares to a trad-
ing volume of 4.9 million contracts at the Borsa Italiana, while the leading European
derivatives trading platform Eurex reports 185 million contracts traded. Relating trade
in WIG20 futures contracts at the WSE to trade in futures on major stock exchanges
throughout Europe by the number of contracts, the WSE ranked about seventh during
the period under investigation here.
On 1 August 2000, futures contracts on the TechWIG index were introduced, with
contracts on the MIDWIG index following on 18 February 2002. Futures contracts on
individual stocks were first launched on 22 January 2001, while futures contracts on
US$ debuted on 25 September 1998 already, followed by futures on the Euro on 1 May
1999. T-note futures were launched on 14 February 2005. Ordinary warrants started
trading on 9 March 1998, with American-style warrants on WIG20 futures contracts
joining in on 24 September 2001. Convertible bonds were first quoted on 25 April 2002.
Put and call options with the WIG20 as underlying were introduced on 22 September
2003, and stock options started trading on 17 October 2005.
Derivatives are traded in the continuous trading system, whose trading hours were
10.15am to 4.00pm prior to the introduction of the quotation system WARSET on 17
November 2000. Thereafter, derivatives were traded from 9.00am to 4.10pm. Since
3 October 2005, the derivatives market has been closing at 4.20pm, with an auction
being held at opening and closing. The contracts expire in March, June, September,
and December, with the last trading day of any given contract being the third Friday of
its expiry month, or the last trading day prior to that Friday in case of public holidays.
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Market makers provide liquidity by placing their own orders in the order book.
Price variation limits are in place and amount to 10% for stock index and individual
stock futures (Warsaw Stock Exchange (2000)). These limits refer both to the difference
between the opening price and the settlement price on the previous day, and to the
variations during a trading day.
According to annual surveys conducted by the WSE, the fraction of turnover value
attributed to individual investors has ranged from 66 to 85% in the past seven years.
This dominance of individual investors is due to three factors: First, the value of a
futures contract equals the product of the multiplier and the price of the underlying.
The former was set to only 10 zl, which currently equals about 2.75 US$. This small
multiplier makes WIG20 index futures affordable for small investors. Second, individual
investors who wish to trade on the Polish futures market can easily register to do so
without formal barriers. Third, institutional investors such as Polish pension funds or
mutual funds are not permitted to trade in derivatives, which ceteris paribus raises the
fraction of individuals engaging in futures trading.
4.3 Data and Methodology
We conduct an intraday analysis of futures contracts on the WIG20 stock index from
December 2000 to June 2007. The electronic trading platform WARSET was launched
on 17 November 2000, where all derivatives instruments have been traded in a con-
tinuous trading mechanism. Our dataset starts with the first full month after the
introduction of WARSET, which results in 47,553 observations. Since we base our
analysis on intraday observations, we can identify the trading time driving the empir-
ical results. In particular, we are able to pinpoint the time of day causing a potential
day-of-the-week anomaly.
Intraday analyses are common in the market microstructure literature, and their
starting point is almost always the splitting of the trading time into separate 15-minute
intervals (Abhyankar et al. (1997), Pirrong (1996), Ding and Lau (2001)). Up until
4.15pm, trades occur on every day in the sample, while trading activity is much reduced
after 4.15pm. In fact, a closing auction is held at 4.20pm. Therefore, the final interval
which we analyse ends at 4.15pm, leading to a total of 29 intervals per day.
The six variables to be investigated are selected based on previous studies such as
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Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Abhyankar et al. (1997), Brooks and Kim (1997),
and Johnston et al. (1991). For the futures market, these variables are the number
of contracts traded, open interest, and two measures of both the price change and its
volatility. The number of contracts is a proxy for trading volume TV and is accumu-
lated inside each interval.
Open interest OI refers to the total number of contracts transacted less those that
could not be matched after a transaction has been settled. For the calculations, we
take the relative contribution of the transactions inside an interval to the level of open
interest OII = (OI
E
I − OIBI )/(OIBI ), with B referring to the first transaction in the
interval I, and E denoting the last transaction in the same interval.
The change in contract price p is the return RI , which can either be measured
continuously compounded inside each interval R1,I = log(p
E
I /p
B
I ), or as the simple
return R2,I = p
E
I − pBI . Dyl and Maberly (1986) argue that the compounded returns
in Cornell (1985) are the inappropriate variable for an investigation of the futures
market, because investors do not face a downpayment. Hence, they cannot make a
return on the investment. However, Cornell (1985) aimed to report results that are
directly comparable to those of other studies examining the cash market. In light of
this debate, we analyse both return variables.
Like for returns, we also use two different approaches to estimate the return volatil-
ity. The first one follows Pirrong (1996) in taking the difference between the highest
and the lowest price within each interval σ1,I = p
max
I − pminI . While this is a simple
measure of price variation, it suppresses any movements inside an interval. Therefore,
we also take full advantage of our transaction-by-transaction data and follow Ding and
Lau (2001) and Madhavan et al. (1997) in calculating a second volatility measure. It is
the standard deviation of the continuously compounded return R1. Since transactions
on the Polish futures market are not frequent enough to calculate this measure for each
interval, we measure the volatility across all intervals of each day d.4 For this, the con-
tinuously compounded return R1,t for any two consecutive transactions is calculated,
with the standard deviation of these returns measuring the return volatility on a daily
4Alternatively, returns can be calculated within an interval, with its volatility being computed
across days per interval (Barclay and Hendershott (2003), Wood et al. (1985)). This approach is not
meaningful in our context as we study the day-of-the-week effect.
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basis σ2,d =
√√√√ T∑
t=1
(R1,t − R¯1,d)2/(T − 1), where t denotes the individual transactions.
The dataset was obtained from the WSE and comprises intraday observations on
prices, the number of contracts traded, and open interest for futures contracts on the
WIG20 index. Cornell (1985), Dyl and Maberly (1986), and Johnston et al. (1991)
exclude potentially highly volatile observations around the delivery date by switching to
the next most distant contract during the entire delivery month of the nearby contract.
We report all results based on this dataset construction.
We run all regressions with all observations, and excluding those from 21 to 31
December as trading volume drops substantially over Christmas and New Year’s. The
latter dataset is used as a robustness check, ensuring that an apparent January effect is
not driven by the reduction in trading activity over the holiday period. Furthermore,
as a second robustness check, we conduct the analysis with the dataset comprising only
observations for the contract nearest to delivery.
Table 8 presents summary statistics for the overall dataset for all six variables. On
average, each transaction comprises 496 contracts, with the number of contracts that
remain unmatched after each transaction increasing by 0.02% per transaction on aver-
age, which is an indicator of liquidity in this index futures market and broadly in line
with the results reported in Chiang and Tapley (1983). The transaction-by-transaction
returns are negative regardless of how they are measured, which is consistent with the
daily returns reported in Chiang and Tapley (1983).
Table 8 about here
There are two types of F -tests to detect a potential Monday (January) effect. In
order to conduct these tests, each of the six variables Vj, j = 1, ..., 6, is regressed, by
interval, on a set of dummy variables. The details of these tests are set out below
for the Monday effect only, as they work analogously for the January effect. The first
type of F -tests is based on the underlying model with an intercept so that the point
estimates of the β-coefficients can be interpreted as differential values (French (1980)
and Keim (1983)):
Vj,I,t = αj,I + β2,j,IDTues,t + β3,j,IDWed,t + β4,j,IDThurs,t + β5,j,IDFri,t + j,t . (9)
I denotes the interval, j refers to the variable V , while t is the time index of each
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transaction. DTues equals one on all Tuesdays and zero otherwise. The other dummy
variables are defined analogously. For instance, βˆ2,j,I shows by how much the Tuesday
average of Vj differs from that for Mondays, which is treated as a benchmark and
captured by αˆj,I . The F -test statistic of H0 : β2,j,I = β3,j,I = β4,j,I = β5,j,I = 0, i.e. the
presence of a Monday effect, is denoted with F1 and becomes statistically significant if
the index futures market exhibits a Monday effect.5
The second type of F -tests is closely related to the first one, although it is less
restrictive. The underlying model specification is equation (9), and the null is H0 :
β2,j,I = β3,j,I = β4,j,I = β5,j,I (Johnston et al. (1991)). This test with the test statistic
F2 determines whether Tuesday through Friday have an equal (differential) effect on
Vj without imposing that this effect be nonexistent.
While F1 shows whether Monday is significantly different from the other four days
of the week as a whole, F2 is an indicator of the variation among Tuesday through
Friday and hence of the day of the week driving F1 to be statistically significant.
For example, it is conceivable that the Polish index futures market exhibits a Friday
effect, while Monday through Thursday have roughly equal mean Vj. In this case,
F1 would still be significant, implying a Monday effect. At the same time, F2 would
be significant, pointing away from the Monday effect by highlighting the difference
among Tuesday through Friday. Thus, by conducting both F -tests, we do not only
investigate a Monday effect but rather a day-of-the-week effect. Likewise, this test
setup captures calendar month anomalies that could be caused by the delivery cycle of
futures contracts since it is not limited to testing for a January effect. The importance
of this comprehensive test approach is heightened by the broad spectrum of variables
that we cover, as trading volume is likely to be more affected by the delivery cycle than
the return.
As the regression analysis is conducted separately for each interval I, a potential
weekday effect can be characterised by the trading time driving this effect. However,
regression (9) cannot be estimated by interval for the second measure of return volatility
σ2,d since it is calculated across intervals I for each trading day d. Testing for a Monday
effect is equally possible with daily data though.
5As a robustness check, we additionally estimate the regression Vj,I,t = αj,I + β2,j,IDTues,t + · ·
·+β5,j,IDFri,t +β6,j,IDHal,t + j,t, where DHal,t equals one for all observations in November through
April and zero otherwise. Thus, we control for the Halloween effect. The empirical results are the
same as those for regression (9) and are therefore not reported or discussed here.
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The January effect is investigated in the same dummy regression framework for the
variables Vj (Reinganum (1983) and Keim (1983)). We first examine a calendar-month
effect estimating the equivalent of regression (9):
Vj,I,t = αj,I + β2,j,IDFeb,t + β3,j,IDMar,t + · · ·+ β12,j,IDDec,t + j,t . (10)
As a robustness check, we determine whether the findings persist when the half year
that January falls into is controlled for (Jacobsen et al. (2005)). During the winter
months November to April, stock index returns tend to be significantly higher than
during the summer months May to October. This market-wide phenomenon is referred
to as the Halloween effect and could cause both F -tests to be significant.6 We therefore
ascertain the existence of a January effect once the Halloween effect has been separated
by estimating the regression
Vj,I,t = αj,I + β1,j,IDHal,t + β2,j,IDJan,t + j,t (11)
where DHal,t = 1 during the winter months November to April and zero otherwise.
DJan,t takes the value one in January and zero throughout the rest of the year. αˆj gives
the mean Vj over the six summer months, and the estimated β-coefficients indicate the
difference in this mean due to the Halloween and the January effects, respectively,
based on t-tests. A statistically significant β1,j coefficient indicates that the mean of
Vj is different in winter compared to its value over the summer. If F1 suggests the
presence of a January effect, but β2,j becomes insignificant in regression (11), then the
driving force behind the significant F1 is the Halloween effect rather than the January
effect.
As in most previous studies (e.g. Harris (1986), Johnston et al. (1991), Keim
(1983)), the point estimates in the models are estimated with OLS. The statistical
inference, however, is based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors which are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. While we do
not estimate a cross-section of futures contracts, White (1980) tests yield ambiguous
results regarding the presence of heteroskedasticity. These test results are not reported
here but are available on request. Moreover, if we aim to test for the presence of a
6The Halloween effect is generally explained by changes in risk aversion due to vacation time,
seasonal affective disorder or temperature changes (Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), Kamstra et al.
(2003), Garrett et al. (2005)). Furthermore, changing liquidity preferences due to the holiday time
might cause investors to sell their stocks, driving down stock prices and hence returns.
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Monday effect, we need to explicitly allow the observations on consecutive Mondays
to be correlated. Thus, we set the lag length to five, thereby correcting the estimated
standard errors of the point estimates for potential autocorrelation in the previous five
days. Raising the maximum lag length further would introduce a higher estimation
error, with the benefit for the goodness-of-fit being at least questionable. As the
investigation of the January effect is also based on daily data, the lag length remains
five.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Monday Effect
Table 9 presents the evidence regarding the day-of-the-week effect for all intervals from
9.00am to 4.15pm. While large p-values for F1 indicate the lack of a day-of-the-week
effect, small p-values imply the existence of an anomaly. For such cases, the F2 columns
provide further insights as to which day of the week is driving this anomaly. Large
p-values for F2 support the hypothesis that Tuesday through Friday are equal, turning
the day-of-the-week effect into a Monday effect. By contrast, small p-values for F2
convey that any one, or a combination, of the four days Tuesday through Friday are
causing the day-of-the-week effect.
Table 9 about here
Trading volume appears to exhibit a day-of-the-week effect in 23 of the 29 intervals,
which represent almost the entire trading time. The trading activity on Mondays is
significantly lower than on Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday across the trading day
(not reported in the table). Moreover, the trading volume on Friday afternoon from
2.30pm onwards is statistically significantly higher than at the same time on Mondays.
In the morning and around lunch time, however, the trading volume is not significantly
different between Mondays and Fridays. Accordingly, the p-values in the F2 column of
Table 9 indicate equality in average trading volume among Tuesday through Friday for
some intervals, and inequality for others. As the dataset excludes expiring contracts
on their delivery date, the raised trading activity on Friday afternoon cannot be driven
by expiration day effects.
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In contrast to Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) and Abraham and Ikenberry (1994),
the empirical evidence suggests that traders on the Polish futures market are gener-
ally less active on Mondays than Tuesday through Friday. This implies that those
individuals who choose to trade on the Polish futures market do not exhibit the same
behavioural patterns as individuals transacting on mature spot markets. Instead, these
individuals have adopted institutions’ trading times.
Another indicator of liquidity on the futures market is open interest. While trading
volume is lower on Mondays than on the other four days of the week, the contribution
of unmatched contracts is not any different throughout the five weekdays. This implies
that weak trading activity on Mondays does not yield fewer unmatched positions than
larger trading volume does on Tuesday to Thursday.
The evidence for the price change and its volatility confirms this insight. If individ-
uals were uninformed, their dominating presence on the Polish futures market should
drive up the volatility of returns, expressing larger uncertainty or information asym-
metry on the market. In fact, neither the return nor its volatility vary statistically
significantly across the five trading days of the week. Thus, even if individuals are
trading particularly strongly or weakly on any given day, their impact on futures price
changes’ volatility is nonexistent. This is consistent with Cornell’s (1985) findings for
the S&P500 index futures market, even though individual investors on the young Polish
market might have been expected to be less well informed about a complex financial
product like futures than traders on a mature market. It can therefore be concluded
that the individuals transacting on the Polish futures market surpass their reputation.
4.4.2 January Effect
Table 10 shows trading volume in January to be statistically significantly different from
its average across the remaining eleven months (F1), with February through December
recording significantly different mean trading volumes (F2). In fact, January records a
signifcantly higher trading activity than the quarter-end months March, June, Septem-
ber, and December, while the number of contracts traded is not significantly different
among January, February, April, May, July, August, October, and November. Thus,
the anomaly whose presence Table 10 suggests is actually not a January one, but rather
a delivery month phenomenon. In these months, the dataset comprises observations on
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the next-nearest-to-delivery futures contract, in which trading volume is relatively low
while the transactions are concentrated in the nearest-to-delivery contract that expires
in that month. In fact, this apparent quarter-end effect vanishes when the dataset
consists, at all times, of observations on the nearest-to-delivery contract. However,
December then still scores a particularly low trading volume even when excluding the
trading days around Christmas and New Year’s. The tax-loss selling hypothesis pre-
dicts high trading activity in December and in January. Our findings are not consistent
with this argument, as it is a less important motive for trading in futures contracts
than for spot deals with substantial downpayments.
Table 10 about here
Open interest also shows a strong calendar-month effect. The contribution to un-
matched contracts is highest in the quarter-end months March, June, September, and
December because these are the months when new contracts are introduced into the
dataset. By definition, open interest has to drop towards the expiration date. Upon
switching to contracts that have longer to live, we observe a rise in open interest.
Consistently with this, we find significantly lower open interest in quarter-end months
when the dataset consists of nearest-to-delivery contracts which expire in those months.
These results are robust against the ommission of the end-December observations.
The volatility of price changes measured as in Pirrong (1996) is significantly higher
in January than in December, regardless of the inclusion of the trading days around
the Christmas holiday period. This could be attributed to more news releases being
disseminated, and reflected in the prices, after the holiday period than before. In fact,
when omitting the end-December observations, the volatility in January is significantly
higher than in March, April, and December. Regarding these two spring months,
the results appear to respond strongly to changes in the dataset. Moreover, when
the analysis is based on the nearest-to-delivery contracts, any differences in return
volatility among calendar months disappear. In summary, the empirical results for
return volatility vary strongly with changes in the dataset. The returns exhibit no
calendar-month anomaly.
As a robustness check, we test for the existence of the January effect once controlled
for the half year that January happens to fall into. For trading volume, both the
January and the Halloween dummy variables are significant, as shown in Table 11.
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Since the apparent January effect (F1 in Table 10) is not actually driven by January,
but rather by the four quarter-end months, this persists when effectively controlling
for two of the four quarter-end months.
Table 11 about here
Likewise for open interest, the apparent January effect remains when controlling for
the Halloween effect. In fact, the six winter months included in the Halloween dummy
variable do not score significantly different open interest contributions compared with
the six summer months. However, open interest in January is significantly lower than
over the summer, which includes two quarter-end months.
In essence, Monday records lower trading volume than Tuesday through Friday,
which is not mirrored by open interest. This is consistent with trading patterns of insti-
tutional investors on mature spot markets (Abraham and Ikenberry (1994), Lakonishok
and Maberly (1990)). Returns and their volatility exhibit no day-of-the-week effect in-
dependently of how these variables are measured. Regarding the January effect, the
unusual months are March, June, September, and December with lower trading volume
and higher open interest than in the remaining months. This effect can be explained by
the delivery cycle of futures contracts and is not a calendar-month anomaly. The tax-
loss selling argument predicts high trading volume on the spot market in December and
January. This cannot be observed on the futures market as there is no downpayment
for the investment, but rather the exchange of margin payments. Overall, the Polish
futures market is not affected by the well established Monday or January anomalies.
One caveat with this analysis is that the sample period only spans six and a half years,
which is a narrow basis to investigate a yearly effect.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the Monday and January anomalies
exist on the Polish futures market, where individuals are the dominating investor type.
Previous empirical evidence for mature futures markets is sparse and suggests that
such markets do not exhibit the well established Monday or January effects, while the
corresponding spot markets are affected by these anomalies. The presence of these
phenomena is primarily attributed to individual investors whose trading behaviour is
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generally regarded as more sentiment-driven than that of institutions. On the Polish
futures market, individual investors account for three quarters of the trading volume.
An intraday analysis of trading volume, open interest, return, and return volatility in
this unique setting of the Polish WIG20 index futures market enables us to contribute
to the debate about the extent to which individuals’ trading behaviour is sentiment-
driven compared with institutions’ trading activities.
In fact, we find that individuals surpass their reputation on the Polish futures
market. Our results support the conclusion of Cornell (1985) that futures returns are
consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis. This is in line with the results of
Chang and Kim (1988) but contradicts Johnston et al. (1991) who report negative
Monday returns before 1982 and positive Tuesday returns after 1984 for GNMA, T-
bond, and T-note futures contracts traded over the Chicago Board of Trade. Likewise,
we find return volatility on the Polish futures market shows no sign of a day-of-the-
week anomaly. Moreover, trading volume on Mondays is lower than on Tuesday through
Friday, which further underscores that individuals do not engage in more active trading
after the weekend and contradicts the evidence in Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) who
argue that individuals drive the Monday effect.
As for a calendar month anomaly, we observe a significantly low trading volume in
the expiration months March, June, September, and December. In these months, the
dataset comprises second-to-nearest-to-delivery futures contracts, while the trading
activity concentrates on expiring contracts. Thus, this apparent quarter-end month
anomaly can be fully explained by the delivery cycle and the construction of the dataset.
It can be concluded that individuals’ trading activities are less sentiment-driven than
the existing literature for mature markets predicts.
Futures contracts are complex financial products, and the Polish market for these
is a very young one. Despite this, we observe a remarkably efficient market for WIG20
index futures. One can hypothesise that this is due to a self-selection among individual
investors. Those who decide to engage in futures trading are far more informed about
these instruments than those who choose to not trade in derivatives. This could be an
explanation for the lack of anomalies on the Polish futures market.
This conclusion raises two further questions. First, why do we observe anomalies on
spot markets, while the corresponding futures markets do not appear to be affected by
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these phenomena? Differences in investor structure between mature spot and the corre-
sponding futures markets could partially account for differences in observed anomalies.
If uninformed individuals prefer straight-forward spot deals over complex futures trad-
ing, then they will be concentrated on the cash market. This results in institutions
trading among themselves in futures markets, where anomalies have been arbitraged
away. Future research could focus on a direct comparison in investor structure between
a spot market with anomalies and a futures market without such regularities. Since
the Polish spot market does not appear to exhibit a day-of-the-week effect from 1992
to 2003 (Basher and Sadorsky (2006)), the analysis should be conducted in a broader
context.
And second, could this shed light on the mechanism relating the spot and futures
markets? It can be conjectured that the mechanism relating the spot and futures
markets is affected by anomalies or measurement errors that cancel out the transmission
of particular regularities from the cash market to the futures market. Further research
could place an emphasis on this.
4.6 Tables
62
T
ab
le
8:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
F
u
tu
re
s
T
ra
d
in
g
on
th
e
W
IG
20
S
to
ck
In
d
ex
in
P
ol
an
d
T
V
O
I
R
1
R
2
σ
1
σ
2
M
ea
n
49
6.
47
0
0.
15
9
−0
.0
09
−0
.0
18
5.
60
8
0.
50
5
M
ed
ia
n
33
8.
00
0
0.
68
8
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
4.
00
0
0.
44
6
S
td
D
ev
52
9.
86
0
9.
72
9
2.
23
5
4.
42
4
4.
95
5
0.
25
6
N
o
of
ob
s
47
,5
53
47
,5
53
47
,5
53
47
,5
53
47
,5
53
1,
65
0
T
ra
d
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
T
V
is
m
ea
su
re
d
as
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
co
n
tr
ac
ts
tr
ad
ed
,
op
en
in
te
re
st
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
as
O
I t
=
(O
I t
−
O
I t
−1
)/
O
I t
−1
,
th
e
co
n
ti
n
u
ou
sl
y
co
m
p
ou
n
d
ed
re
tu
rn
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
R
1
,t
=
lo
g
(p
t/
p t
−1
),
th
e
si
m
p
le
re
tu
rn
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
as
R
2
,t
=
p t
−
p t
−1
,
th
e
vo
la
ti
li
ty
fo
ll
ow
in
g
P
ir
ro
n
g
(1
99
6)
is
σ
1
,t
=
pm
a
x
t
−
pm
in
t
,
w
h
il
e
th
e
vo
la
ti
li
ty
in
M
ad
h
av
an
et
al
.
(1
99
7)
,
σ
2
,
is
m
ea
su
re
d
as
th
e
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
of
R
1
ov
er
ea
ch
d
ay
.
O
I
,
R
1
,
an
d
σ
2
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
th
ou
sa
n
d
s.
T
h
e
si
m
p
le
re
tu
rn
an
d
σ
1
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
zl
ot
y
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
ru
n
s
fr
om
D
ec
em
b
er
20
00
to
J
u
n
e
20
07
.
63
T
ab
le
9:
M
on
d
ay
E
ff
ec
t
on
th
e
P
ol
is
h
F
u
tu
re
s
M
ar
ke
t
T
V
I
O
I I
R
1
,I
R
2
,I
σ
1
,I
In
te
rv
al
I
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
9.
00
-9
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
48
4
0.
32
8
0.
76
1
0.
77
8
0.
91
6
0.
90
6
0.
23
8
0.
24
5
9.
16
-9
.3
0
0.
13
2
0.
24
6
0.
37
8
0.
24
2
0.
23
5
0.
17
5
0.
32
2
0.
23
0
0.
69
2
0.
87
1
9.
31
-9
.4
5
0.
05
5∗
0.
08
5∗
0.
38
2
0.
24
7
0.
95
4
0.
90
4
0.
71
6
0.
55
2
0.
95
1
0.
87
8
9.
46
-1
0.
00
0.
00
3∗
∗∗
0.
06
2∗
0.
85
9
0.
78
2
0.
77
9
0.
85
5
0.
92
4
0.
94
2
0.
67
6
0.
50
8
10
.0
1-
10
.1
5
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
10
2
0.
30
8
0.
18
9
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
41
6
0.
29
4
10
.1
6-
10
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
04
1∗
∗
0.
63
1
0.
99
2
0.
94
6
0.
87
4
0.
92
8
0.
85
0
0.
02
8∗
∗
0.
32
5
10
.3
1-
10
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
3∗
∗
0.
48
1
0.
65
7
0.
54
1
0.
85
8
0.
42
0
0.
88
2
0.
24
2
0.
22
5
10
.4
6-
11
.0
0
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
21
9
0.
01
6∗
∗
0.
00
7∗
∗∗
0.
57
5
0.
77
5
0.
46
4
0.
45
9
0.
50
9
0.
76
8
11
.0
1-
11
.1
5
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
06
0∗
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
2∗
∗
0.
04
7∗
∗
0.
02
9∗
∗
0.
33
8
0.
22
3
0.
18
2
0.
15
9
11
.1
6-
11
.3
0
0.
01
1∗
∗
0.
56
5
0.
23
7
0.
21
8
0.
15
8
0.
45
1
0.
09
2∗
0.
54
1
0.
27
9
0.
49
9
11
.3
1-
11
.4
5
0.
01
8∗
∗
0.
78
1
0.
86
6
0.
82
6
0.
91
9
0.
82
2
0.
98
8
0.
95
5
0.
88
5
0.
77
7
11
.4
6-
12
.0
0
0.
00
7∗
∗∗
0.
36
3
0.
03
4∗
∗
0.
72
1
0.
64
0
0.
69
1
0.
39
5
0.
46
1
0.
34
3
0.
29
9
12
.0
1-
12
.1
5
0.
22
9
0.
46
6
0.
21
3
0.
18
5
0.
73
9
0.
77
2
0.
77
5
0.
85
8
0.
77
7
0.
95
5
12
.1
6-
12
.3
0
0.
03
7∗
∗
0.
02
8∗
∗
0.
01
4∗
∗
0.
02
7∗
∗
0.
80
5
0.
65
7
0.
79
9
0.
66
7
0.
36
2
0.
53
3
12
.3
1-
12
.4
5
0.
03
2∗
∗
0.
02
0∗
∗
0.
18
7
0.
11
9
0.
13
6
0.
35
3
0.
20
8
0.
61
1
0.
85
6
0.
76
7
12
.4
6-
13
.0
0
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
7∗
∗
0.
38
0
0.
39
9
0.
20
4
0.
11
5
0.
26
9
0.
16
3
0.
60
9
0.
45
9
13
.0
1-
13
.1
5
0.
02
4∗
∗
0.
02
9∗
∗
0.
04
8∗
∗
0.
04
7∗
∗
0.
29
6
0.
40
3
0.
54
9
0.
76
7
0.
42
9
0.
38
1
13
.1
6-
13
.3
0
0.
04
3∗
∗
0.
21
3
0.
31
8
0.
73
1
0.
82
7
0.
89
2
0.
87
3
0.
96
3
0.
69
5
0.
80
9
13
.3
1-
13
.4
5
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
2∗
∗
0.
17
3
0.
44
1
0.
68
7
0.
53
7
0.
50
8
0.
40
2
0.
33
8
0.
28
8
13
.4
6-
14
.0
0
0.
07
7∗
0.
18
8
0.
20
1
0.
18
1
0.
94
6
0.
88
0
0.
82
2
0.
68
3
0.
48
6
0.
62
5
14
.0
1-
14
.1
5
0.
26
1
0.
58
0
0.
75
9
0.
60
2
0.
69
0
0.
95
3
0.
86
3
0.
96
0
0.
67
9
0.
52
4
14
.1
6-
14
.3
0
0.
28
0
0.
61
9
0.
63
1
0.
46
4
0.
24
5
0.
20
2
0.
41
2
0.
28
2
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
14
.3
1-
14
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
18
4
0.
05
5∗
0.
33
5
0.
43
2
0.
37
5
0.
57
8
0.
55
1
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
5∗
∗∗
14
.4
6-
15
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
04
8∗
∗
0.
02
4∗
∗
0.
01
3∗
∗
0.
69
6
0.
53
5
0.
69
1
0.
56
1
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
22
8
15
.0
1-
15
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
2∗
∗
0.
17
0
0.
38
7
0.
28
8
0.
27
5
0.
17
9
0.
19
1
0.
17
1
0.
29
8
15
.1
6-
15
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
11
2
0.
21
3
0.
14
9
0.
06
5∗
0.
03
2∗
∗
0.
07
1∗
0.
03
5∗
∗
0.
46
2
0.
61
3
15
.3
1-
15
.4
5
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
16
0
0.
03
0∗
∗
0.
15
9
0.
31
6
0.
31
7
0.
40
3
0.
46
2
0.
28
2
0.
31
2
15
.4
6-
16
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
05
6∗
0.
39
5
0.
41
9
0.
89
8
0.
79
0
0.
73
9
0.
62
0
0.
53
5
0.
45
9
16
.0
1-
16
.1
5
0.
01
8∗
∗
0.
84
0
0.
69
2
0.
54
2
0.
56
0
0.
40
8
0.
52
3
0.
38
3
0.
85
7
0.
88
9
T
ra
d
in
g
v
o
lu
m
e
T
V
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
tr
a
d
ed
,
o
p
en
in
te
re
st
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
O
I t
=
(O
I t
−
O
I t
−
1
)/
O
I t
−
1
,
th
e
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
sl
y
co
m
p
o
u
n
d
ed
re
tu
rn
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
R
1
,I
=
lo
g
(p
E I
/
p
B I
),
th
e
si
m
p
le
re
tu
rn
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
s
R
2
,I
=
p
E I
−
p
B I
,
a
n
d
th
e
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
P
ir
ro
n
g
(1
9
9
6
)
is
σ
1
,I
=
p
m
a
x
I
−
p
m
in
I
.
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
V
j
,I
,t
=
α
j
,I
+
β
2
,j
,I
D
T
u
e
s
,t
+
β
3
,j
,I
D
W
e
d
,t
+
β
4
,j
,I
D
T
h
u
r
s
,t
+
β
5
,j
,I
D
F
r
i,
t
+
 j
,t
w
it
h
O
L
S
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
a
u
to
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
w
it
h
N
ew
ey
a
n
d
W
es
t
(1
9
8
7
).
F
1
te
st
s
fo
r
eq
u
a
li
ty
o
f
a
ll
fi
v
e
d
a
y
s
o
f
th
e
w
ee
k
,
w
h
er
ea
s
F
2
te
st
s
fo
r
eq
u
a
li
ty
a
m
o
n
g
T
u
es
d
a
y
th
ro
u
g
h
F
ri
d
a
y.
R
ep
o
rt
ed
a
re
th
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
im
p
li
ed
b
y
th
es
e
F
-t
es
ts
.
L
a
rg
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
in
d
ic
a
te
th
e
a
b
se
n
ce
o
f
a
M
o
n
d
a
y
a
n
o
m
a
ly
.
∗ ,
∗∗
,∗
∗∗
d
en
o
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
σ
2
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
R
1
o
v
er
ea
ch
d
a
y,
w
it
h
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
p
-v
a
lu
e
fo
r
F
1
a
m
o
u
n
ti
n
g
to
0
.2
9
0
a
n
d
fo
r
F
2
to
0
.9
7
1
.
64
T
ab
le
10
:
J
an
u
ar
y
E
ff
ec
t
on
th
e
P
ol
is
h
F
u
tu
re
s
M
ar
ke
t
T
V
I
O
I I
R
1
,I
R
2
,I
σ
1
,I
In
te
rv
al
I
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
F
1
F
2
9.
00
-9
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
64
5
0.
77
8
0.
58
4
0.
62
1
0.
42
6
0.
34
2
9.
16
-9
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
07
3∗
0.
06
6∗
0.
04
1∗
∗
0.
03
6∗
∗
0.
37
1
0.
35
7
9.
31
-9
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
15
2
0.
11
1
0.
18
2
0.
13
5
0.
37
1
0.
32
9
9.
46
-1
0.
00
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
56
9
0.
52
8
0.
66
3
0.
57
9
0.
08
4∗
0.
07
3∗
10
.0
1-
10
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
74
8
0.
76
9
0.
92
2
0.
89
1
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
10
.1
6-
10
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
14
7
0.
17
3
0.
03
7∗
∗
0.
07
0∗
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
4∗
∗∗
10
.3
1-
10
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
98
7
0.
98
1
0.
92
7
0.
90
8
0.
05
9∗
0.
04
1∗
∗
10
.4
6-
11
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
67
3
0.
58
6
0.
71
1
0.
63
4
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
11
.0
1-
11
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
45
1
0.
40
4
0.
42
0
0.
37
4
0.
01
8∗
∗
0.
01
8∗
∗
11
.1
6-
11
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
15
8
0.
17
1
0.
21
6
0.
23
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
11
.3
1-
11
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
58
9
0.
50
4
0.
36
7
0.
30
3
0.
05
2∗
0.
09
0∗
11
.4
6-
12
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
82
0
0.
75
0
0.
66
3
0.
57
5
0.
00
7∗
∗∗
0.
01
2∗
∗
12
.0
1-
12
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
9∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
57
2
0.
85
4
0.
74
0
0.
95
5
0.
04
3∗
∗
0.
08
7∗
12
.1
6-
12
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
10
9
0.
10
9
0.
37
8
0.
31
6
0.
00
3∗
∗∗
0.
00
6∗
∗∗
12
.3
1-
12
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
38
7
0.
47
9
0.
17
4
0.
23
5
0.
00
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
6∗
∗∗
12
.4
6-
13
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
01
3∗
∗
0.
00
9∗
∗∗
0.
04
8∗
∗
0.
03
2∗
∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
13
.0
1-
13
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
31
5
0.
26
2
0.
19
1
0.
15
2
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
13
.1
6-
13
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
24
5
0.
23
2
0.
66
3
0.
59
5
0.
02
0∗
∗
0.
03
3∗
∗
13
.3
1-
13
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
18
3
0.
17
3
0.
09
8∗
0.
08
3∗
0.
01
2∗
∗
0.
01
8∗
∗
13
.4
6-
14
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
30
7
0.
34
6
0.
27
8
0.
31
2
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
5∗
∗∗
14
.0
1-
14
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
16
3
0.
12
1
0.
10
4
0.
07
2∗
0.
06
5∗
0.
04
4∗
∗
14
.1
6-
14
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
62
5
0.
53
8
0.
49
2
0.
41
4
0.
09
2∗
0.
07
5∗
14
.3
1-
14
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
08
2∗
0.
08
4∗
0.
07
5∗
0.
06
6∗
0.
04
3∗
∗
0.
04
8∗
∗
14
.4
6-
15
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
30
6
0.
29
4
0.
55
0
0.
55
9
0.
12
7
0.
10
1
15
.0
1-
15
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
73
8
0.
83
8
0.
84
2
0.
90
4
0.
18
0
0.
20
3
15
.1
6-
15
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
83
4
0.
84
4
0.
77
0
0.
81
6
0.
22
7
0.
23
3
15
.3
1-
15
.4
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
07
3∗
0.
06
6∗
0.
13
6
0.
11
1
0.
02
1∗
∗
0.
04
1∗
∗
15
.4
6-
16
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
77
0
0.
73
6
0.
77
9
0.
73
9
0.
42
0
0.
58
0
16
.0
1-
16
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
84
2
0.
77
8
0.
52
3
0.
44
0
0.
50
0
0.
41
8
0.
86
9
0.
82
2
T
ra
d
in
g
v
o
lu
m
e
T
V
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
tr
a
d
ed
,
o
p
en
in
te
re
st
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
O
I t
=
(O
I t
−
O
I t
−
1
)/
O
I t
−
1
,
th
e
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
sl
y
co
m
p
o
u
n
d
ed
re
tu
rn
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
R
1
,I
=
lo
g
(p
E I
/
p
B I
),
th
e
si
m
p
le
re
tu
rn
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
s
R
2
,I
=
p
E I
−
p
B I
,
a
n
d
th
e
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
P
ir
ro
n
g
(1
9
9
6
)
is
σ
1
,I
=
p
m
a
x
I
−
p
m
in
I
.
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
V
j
,I
,t
=
α
j
,I
+
β
2
,j
,I
D
F
e
b
,t
+
β
3
,j
,I
D
M
a
r
,t
+
β
4
,j
,I
D
A
p
r
,t
+
··
·+
β
1
2
,j
,I
D
D
e
c
,t
+
 j
,t
w
it
h
O
L
S
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
a
u
to
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
w
it
h
N
ew
ey
a
n
d
W
es
t
(1
9
8
7
).
F
1
te
st
s
fo
r
eq
u
a
li
ty
o
f
a
ll
tw
el
v
e
ca
le
n
d
a
r
m
o
n
th
s,
w
h
er
ea
s
F
2
te
st
s
fo
r
eq
u
a
li
ty
a
m
o
n
g
F
eb
ru
a
ry
th
ro
u
g
h
D
ec
em
b
er
.
R
ep
o
rt
ed
a
re
th
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
im
p
li
ed
b
y
th
es
e
F
-t
es
ts
.
L
a
rg
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
in
d
ic
a
te
th
e
a
b
se
n
ce
o
f
a
J
a
n
u
a
ry
a
n
o
m
a
ly
.
∗ ,
∗∗
,∗
∗∗
d
en
o
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
σ
2
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
R
1
o
v
er
ea
ch
d
a
y,
w
it
h
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
p
-v
a
lu
e
fo
r
F
1
a
m
o
u
n
ti
n
g
to
0
.0
0
0
a
n
d
fo
r
F
2
to
0
.0
0
0
.
65
T
ab
le
11
:
J
an
u
ar
y
E
ff
ec
t
on
th
e
P
ol
is
h
F
u
tu
re
s
M
ar
ke
t,
co
n
tr
ol
le
d
fo
r
th
e
H
al
lo
w
ee
n
E
ff
ec
t
T
V
I
O
I I
R
1
,I
R
2
,I
σ
1
,I
In
te
rv
al
I
H
al
J
an
H
al
J
an
H
al
J
an
H
al
J
an
H
al
J
an
9.
00
-9
.1
5
0.
00
8∗
∗∗
0.
06
0∗
0.
99
0
0.
01
7∗
∗
0.
40
7
0.
21
6
0.
15
4
0.
55
6
0.
31
0
0.
85
4
9.
16
-9
.3
0
0.
01
2∗
∗
0.
03
4∗
∗
0.
90
3
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
18
0
0.
18
7
0.
13
2
0.
16
4
0.
09
4∗
0.
24
0
9.
31
-9
.4
5
0.
06
6∗
0.
18
8
0.
24
1
0.
01
6∗
∗
0.
53
5
0.
53
0
0.
58
7
0.
86
3
0.
38
6
0.
53
8
9.
46
-1
0.
00
0.
02
5∗
∗
0.
05
6∗
0.
95
1
0.
01
1∗
∗
0.
38
5
0.
39
1
0.
13
2
0.
68
5
0.
06
7∗
0.
31
2
10
.0
1-
10
.1
5
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
64
7
0.
07
9∗
0.
69
8
0.
34
4
0.
36
7
0.
84
3
0.
00
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
7∗
∗∗
10
.1
6-
10
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
15
4
0.
02
2∗
∗
0.
11
0
0.
14
8
0.
13
4
0.
04
8∗
∗
0.
03
3∗
∗
0.
02
2∗
∗
10
.3
1-
10
.4
5
0.
00
4∗
∗∗
0.
11
5
0.
97
5
0.
49
0
0.
36
5
0.
49
0
0.
33
7
0.
44
0
0.
09
5∗
0.
40
8
10
.4
6-
11
.0
0
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
01
3∗
∗
0.
60
1
0.
97
0
0.
40
2
0.
85
2
0.
77
3
0.
83
0
0.
03
4∗
∗
0.
10
3
11
.0
1-
11
.1
5
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
4∗
∗∗
0.
17
7
0.
33
3
0.
82
9
0.
47
2
0.
72
9
0.
52
1
0.
03
6∗
∗
0.
12
2
11
.1
6-
11
.3
0
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
01
4∗
∗
0.
95
4
0.
09
7∗
0.
76
4
0.
16
3
0.
94
7
0.
16
4
0.
02
2∗
∗
0.
13
5
11
.3
1-
11
.4
5
0.
04
7∗
∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
73
6
0.
05
2∗
0.
69
0
0.
92
7
0.
53
5
0.
79
3
0.
10
3
0.
04
7∗
∗
11
.4
6-
12
.0
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
46
1
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
22
3
0.
74
0
0.
23
7
0.
65
3
0.
03
7∗
∗
0.
03
5∗
∗
12
.0
1-
12
.1
5
0.
03
8∗
∗
0.
00
6∗
∗∗
0.
28
8
0.
03
4∗
∗
0.
82
1
0.
04
7∗
∗
0.
96
5
0.
05
6∗
0.
09
9∗
0.
03
2∗
∗
12
.1
6-
12
.3
0
0.
03
8∗
∗
0.
00
6∗
∗∗
0.
85
1
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
03
9∗
∗
0.
44
1
0.
17
7
0.
74
1
0.
11
0
0.
06
3∗
12
.3
1-
12
.4
5
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
8∗
∗∗
0.
83
9
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
36
6
0.
20
2
0.
48
7
0.
13
0
0.
05
0∗
∗
0.
07
2∗
12
.4
6-
13
.0
0
0.
00
5∗
∗∗
0.
00
4∗
∗∗
0.
11
9
0.
00
5∗
∗∗
0.
45
6
0.
57
6
0.
54
2
0.
79
0
0.
00
8∗
∗∗
0.
05
3∗
13
.0
1-
13
.1
5
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
00
8∗
∗∗
0.
33
1
0.
02
4∗
∗
0.
27
0
0.
55
5
0.
91
1
0.
77
4
0.
01
1∗
∗
0.
04
7∗
∗
13
.1
6-
13
.3
0
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
63
2
0.
04
4∗
∗
0.
83
4
0.
41
2
0.
81
8
0.
61
8
0.
02
3∗
∗
0.
05
6∗
13
.3
1-
13
.4
5
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
85
0
0.
00
1∗
∗∗
0.
51
9
0.
29
4
0.
33
7
0.
31
5
0.
02
8∗
∗
0.
06
3∗
13
.4
6-
14
.0
0
0.
00
4∗
∗∗
0.
00
5∗
∗∗
0.
69
5
0.
04
8∗
∗
0.
70
0
0.
17
1
0.
88
3
0.
18
7
0.
07
3∗
0.
03
5∗
∗
14
.0
1-
14
.1
5
0.
05
9∗
0.
33
3
0.
26
7
0.
01
3∗
∗
0.
00
4∗
∗∗
0.
28
4
0.
01
6∗
∗
0.
36
8
0.
16
4
0.
74
3
14
.1
6-
14
.3
0
0.
02
8∗
∗
0.
10
8
0.
97
2
0.
07
2∗
0.
52
8
0.
83
9
0.
59
8
0.
97
5
0.
18
6
0.
34
3
14
.3
1-
14
.4
5
0.
09
3∗
0.
03
2∗
∗
0.
36
4
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
46
6
0.
18
8
0.
42
8
0.
28
1
0.
22
8
0.
15
6
14
.4
6-
15
.0
0
0.
04
7∗
∗
0.
06
6∗
0.
31
6
0.
04
5∗
∗
0.
17
9
0.
27
5
0.
10
1
0.
23
0
0.
06
5∗
0.
31
4
15
.0
1-
15
.1
5
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
02
1∗
∗
0.
02
7∗
∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
42
6
0.
24
7
0.
63
9
0.
26
5
0.
10
4
0.
11
1
15
.1
6-
15
.3
0
0.
07
1∗
0.
03
3∗
∗
0.
23
6
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
36
8
0.
24
6
0.
35
4
0.
16
8
0.
70
3
0.
56
2
15
.3
1-
15
.4
5
0.
03
3∗
∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
36
9
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
78
5
0.
26
6
0.
55
4
0.
34
2
0.
22
1
0.
06
6∗
15
.4
6-
16
.0
0
0.
01
0∗
∗∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
07
7∗
0.
00
0∗
∗∗
0.
92
5
0.
48
5
0.
81
6
0.
42
8
0.
46
6
0.
09
5∗
16
.0
1-
16
.1
5
0.
02
5∗
∗
0.
00
2∗
∗∗
0.
63
1
0.
30
6
0.
40
2
0.
56
7
0.
39
8
0.
54
0
0.
54
5
0.
79
9
T
ra
d
in
g
v
o
lu
m
e
T
V
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
tr
a
d
ed
,
o
p
en
in
te
re
st
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
O
I t
=
(O
I t
−
O
I t
−
1
)/
O
I t
−
1
,
th
e
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
sl
y
co
m
p
o
u
n
d
ed
re
tu
rn
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
R
1
,I
=
lo
g
(p
E I
/
p
B I
),
th
e
si
m
p
le
re
tu
rn
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
s
R
2
,I
=
p
E I
−
p
B I
,
a
n
d
th
e
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
P
ir
ro
n
g
(1
9
9
6
)
is
σ
1
,I
=
p
m
a
x
I
−
p
m
in
I
.
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
V
j
,I
,t
=
α
j
,I
+
β
1
,j
,I
D
H
a
l,
t
+
β
2
,j
,I
D
J
a
n
,t
+
 j
,t
w
it
h
O
L
S
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
a
u
to
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
w
it
h
N
ew
ey
a
n
d
W
es
t
(1
9
8
7
).
R
ep
o
rt
ed
a
re
th
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
im
p
li
ed
b
y
t-
te
st
s.
L
a
rg
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
in
d
ic
a
te
th
e
a
b
se
n
ce
o
f
a
J
a
n
u
a
ry
o
r
H
a
ll
o
w
ee
n
a
n
o
m
a
ly
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
∗ ,
∗∗
,∗
∗∗
d
en
o
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
σ
2
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
R
1
o
v
er
ea
ch
d
a
y,
w
it
h
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
p
-v
a
lu
e
fo
r
t H
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
ti
n
g
to
0
.6
3
4
a
n
d
fo
r
t J
a
n
to
0
.0
3
3
.
66
5 Do Individual Investors on the Futures Market
Induce higher Spot Market Volatility?
5.1 Introduction
There are two strands of theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of the in-
troduction of derivatives trading on spot market volatility. One of them argues that
derivatives trading increases the corresponding spot market volatility, while the other
strand finds the opposite effect on return volatility of the underlying instrument. A
key argument in this debate is the extent to which traders on the derivatives market
are informed relative to those on the spot market (Stein (1987), Cox (1976)). We
investigate the impact of the introduction of Polish futures and options on the con-
ditional return volatility of the underlyings. Since individuals account for more than
three quarters of trading volume on the Polish futures market and 73% of turnover
value in options across the most recent years, the reaction of the cash market volatility
following the introduction of derivatives trading is indicative of the degree to which
Polish individuals transacting on the derivatives market are informed relative to the
traders on the spot market. Moreover, the impact of derivatives trading on the cash
market is of interest to regulators since a destabilising effect might justify restrictions
on derivatives trading.7
The spot and futures markets are interlinked through the cost-of-carry relation
which states that the arbitrage-free futures price equals the cost of holding the cash
position and delivering it into the forward contract. Calls and puts enable investors
to create synthetic futures contracts, resulting in options to have an impact on cash
market volatility that is analogous to that of the futures market. Moreover, Sarris
(1984) argues that some investors who used to transact on the cash market before
derivatives were introduced will trade on both markets once derivatives are launched.
As a result, they will change their spot market holdings and thus change cash market
dynamics.
Among the theoretical studies arguing that derivatives trading can destabilise the
underlying spot market are Ross (1989), Stein (1987), and Hart and Kreps (1986). On
the one hand, if objective new information is effectively transmitted from the futures
7In the U.S., trading in futures on most agricultural products was regulated until 1974 in order to
limit spot price fluctuations.
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market to the cash market and hence the information flow onto the spot market is
improved following the onset of futures trading, spot market volatility should increase
(Ross (1989)). Therefore, Edwards (1988b) argues that higher stock return volatility
can be a sign of a well-functioning spot market. On the other hand, Figlewski (1981)
shows empirically that futures traders who are less well informed than spot market
participants destabilise the cash market.
Stein (1987) proposes a theoretical model in which the impact of the introduction
of a derivatives market on spot price variability depends on the degree to which deriva-
tives traders are informed relative to spot traders. If derivatives traders are perfectly
informed or completely uninformed, derivatives trading has a stabilising effect on the
cash market where traders are fully informed. In the former case, the debut of deriva-
tives simply adds more investors of the same degree of information to the market. The
intuition behind the latter case is that spot traders correctly anticipate the actions
of derivatives traders and trade against these, because uninformed derivatives traders
do not alter the perfect information held by spot traders. Releasing this assumption
yields a more realistic intermediate scenario with somewhat informed participants in
both spot and derivatives markets. Uninformed spot traders destabilise the spot mar-
ket, and uninformed derivatives traders introduce additional uncertainty that cannot
be ’stabilised away’ by equally uninformed spot traders. Thus, an observed destabil-
ising effect of derivatives trading implies that spot and derivatives traders are equally
informed, while a stabilising effect indicates an information differential between spot
and derivatives traders. While the model introduced by Stein (1987) cannot be tested
directly, it provides a theoretical foundation for the interpretation of our empirical
results.
Moreover, Hart and Kreps (1986) argue that speculative activity is likely to desta-
bilise prices regardless of how well these speculators are informed. Speculators will
buy when the chance of rising prices increases, and they will sell as the likelihood of
falling prices goes up. This trading behaviour raises price variability in the short term
under otherwise equal conditions. Thus, if derivatives traders have mostly speculative
motives, the cash market is likely destabilised following the introduction of futures or
options.
By contrast, a number of theoretical studies show that derivatives trading has a
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stabilising effect on spot prices (Peck (1976), Sarris (1984), Turnovsky (1983)). In
particular, Danthine (1978) argues that futures traders are better informed than spot
traders, and hence futures prices transmit information to relatively uninformed spot
traders. This results in a stabilised cash market. Cox (1976) and Hiraki et al. (1995)
present empirical evidence for futures traders to be better informed than spot traders.
Empirically, the market completion achieved through the introduction of derivatives
trading improves risk-sharing in the spot market (Gulen and Mayhew (2000)), enhances
market efficiency there (Bologna and Cavallo (2002)) and has thus a stabilising overall
effect on the cash market.
The ambiguity of theoretical arguments about the effect of derivatives trading on
conditional spot market volatility has lead to an ongoing empirical debate, yielding
equally mixed evidence. While Antoniou and Holmes (1995), Bae et al. (2004), and
Butterworth (2000) find a destabilising effect, Edwards (1988a,b), Gulen and Mayhew
(2000), Raju and Karande (2003), and Antoniou et al. (2005) report decreased spot
market volatility following the introduction of futures trading. Similarly, several studies
find the introduction of options trading to decrease return volatility of the underlying
stocks (Damodaran and Lim (1991), Conrad (1989), Skinner (1989)). In these studies,
conditional spot market volatility is examined around the dates when futures or options
are launched, since direct empirical tests of theoretical models such as the one proposed
by Stein (1987) are impossible.
While most empirical investigations focus on mature markets (e.g. Antoniou and
Holmes (1995), Edwards (1988a,b), Cox (1976)), Gulen and Mayhew (2000) provide
international evidence for 17 markets excluding Poland, as the post-event time series for
the Polish market was too short at the time. These mature markets are dominated by
well informed institutional investors, whereas individuals account for more than three
quarters of trading volume on the Polish futures market. This institutional peculiarity
of the Polish derivatives market enables us to empirically test more directly than in
previous studies the theoretical argument that the impact of derivatives trading on
conditional spot market volatility depends on the degree to which futures and options
traders are informed compared to spot market participants. Cohen et al. (2002) show
that institutional investors’ trading decisions are based on fundamental information.
Thus, institutions drive stock prices to their fair values by trading against individuals,
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thereby stabilising stock prices. Moreover, individuals are less well informed than
institutions (Dennis and Weston (2001)), and individuals’ trading decisions are more
biased by behavioural aspects than institutions’ trading activities (Kamesaka et al.
(2003)). This is consistent with Figlewski (1981) who reports that uninformed futures
traders destabilise the cash market.
In essence, theoretical arguments regarding the impact of the introduction of futures
and options trading on the spot market volatility are ambiguous, leaving the subject
to empirical investigation. Specifically, we raise three research questions. First, we
examine the effect of the debut of futures and options trading on the conditional
volatility of the corresponding underlying instrument on the cash market. Since the
Polish derivatives market is dominated by individuals who are generally perceived as
being less well informed than institutions, we expect to find higher conditional volatility
on the spot market following the introduction of futures and options trading. This
destabilising hypothesis is consistent with Figlewski (1981) and the argument that
uninformed individuals transacting on the derivatives market introduce noisy price
signals into the underlying spot market. However, if our empirical findings support
the stabilising hypothesis, this can be viewed as evidence against individual investors’
trading decisions being generally sentiment-driven.
Second, we ascertain whether the spot market’s reaction to the arrival of news
changed when derivatives trading commenced. The GARCH model suggested by
Glosten et al. (1993) enables us to explicitly capture asymmetric responses on the spot
market to positive and negative return shocks. Antoniou et al. (1998) find asymmetries
to transfer from the spot market to the futures market when the latter is introduced,
while McKenzie et al. (2001) report mixed evidence regarding the direction of the
change in asymmetries. Third, we check whether observed changes in conditional spot
market volatility coincide with the introduction of derivatives. Bologna and Cavallo
(2002) confirm this coincidence for the Italian stock market. We investigate a wide
range of introduction dates of futures and options, and we shrink the sample period
around these dates in order to exclude the effect of other events near the launch dates
of the derivatives.
In order to empirically investigate the impact of individuals’ derivatives trading on
the spot market volatility in Poland, section 2 describes the institutional background of
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these two markets. Section 3 introduces the methodology and the dataset, before sec-
tion 4 presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 5 summarises our findings
and concludes.
5.2 The Polish Spot and Derivatives Markets
The first stock exchange in Warsaw was founded in 1817. Having been closed during
World War II and the communist era, the Polish stock market was re-opened on 16
April 1991. Exactly three years later, the WIG20 stock price index was launched.8 This
index reflects the performance of twenty blue chip stocks listed on the main market of
the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The mWIG40 (called MIDWIG until 18 March
2007), a mid-cap price index, followed on 21 September 1998, and the TechWIG price
index, representing innovative technologies, on 31 December 1999.
Being a medium-size stock exchange in Europe, the WSE ranks first in market
capitalisation and turnover value among the exchanges in the 12 states that joined the
European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007. The total value of share trading at the WSE
in 2006 amounted to 55,702 million US$, which compares to 30,909 million US$ at
the Budapest Stock Exchange and 82,049 million US$ at the Vienna Stock Exchange,
which is among the smaller West-European exchanges. For the WSE, this represents
an 83% increase relative to 2005, while the Budapest Stock Exchange only grew by
28%. The Polish stock market has been growing rapidly in part because formerly state-
owned companies were privatised and listed on the WSE. The first foreign company
(Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG) was listed at the WSE on 14 October 2003. Since
1 May 2004, the exchange’s market structure has been complying with EU standards,
i.e. securities trading has two segments, the main market and the regulated unofficial
parallel market.
Initially, there was a spot market only. Futures contracts on the WIG20 have been
traded at the WSE since 16 January 1998. This was the first derivative product in-
troduced by the exchange, which quickly became very popular among Polish investors.
During 1999, the trading volume in the WIG20 futures market rose over eightfold rel-
ative to the previous year, and in 2000 the growth in turnover was sevenfold compared
8All information about the Warsaw Stock Exchange is taken from the annual fact books. The
comparisons of the Warsaw Stock Exchange with other exchanges are based on the World Federation
of Exchanges Annual Report 2006.
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to 1999. In 2006, the trading volume for the stock index futures market at the WSE,
measured as the number of contracts traded, reached 6.3 millions. This compares to a
trading volume of 1.9 million contracts at the Budapest Stock Exchange and 155,000 at
the Vienna Stock Exchange, while the leading European derivatives trading platform
Eurex reports 270 million contracts traded.
On 1 August 2000, futures contracts on the TechWIG index were introduced, with
contracts on the mWIG40 index following on 18 February 2002. Futures contracts on
individual stocks were first launched on 22 January 2001. Put and call options with the
WIG20 as underlying were introduced on 22 September 2003, and stock options started
trading on 17 October 2005. Table 12 gives an overview of these events. Moreover,
trading has been suspended in futures on three individual stocks.9
Table 12 about here
Derivatives are traded in the continuous trading system, whose trading hours were
10.15am to 4.00pm prior to the introduction of the quotation system WARSET on 17
November 2000. Thereafter, derivatives were traded from 9.00am to 4.10pm. Since
3 October 2005, the derivatives market has been closing at 4.20pm, with an auction
being held at opening and closing. The contracts expire in March, June, September,
and December. The last trading day of any given contract is the third Friday of its
expiry month, or the last trading day prior to that Friday in case of public holidays.
Price variation limits for shares, futures, and options are in place at the WSE.
Potentially relevant to our empirical investigation are the price limits on the cash
market. A transaction price for shares in continuous trading had to lie inside a 10%-
corridor around the opening price, and for shares traded in the auction system the
benchmark value was the previous day’s price. When the stock price hits these limits,
the specialist broker appointed by the exchange intervenes by trying to balance the
market through buying or selling securities in his own account. If it is impossible to
find the market clearing price in this way, the size of the order imbalance is estimated.
For imbalances between supply and demand of 5:1 and larger, trading is suspended,
and for smaller imbalances the submitted orders are subject to proportional reduction
9For completeness: Futures contracts on US$ debuted on 25 September 1998, followed by futures
on the Euro on 1 May 1999. T-note futures were launched on 14 February 2005. Ordinary warrants
started trading on 9 March 1998, with American-style warrants on WIG20 futures contracts joining
in on 24 September 2001. Convertible bonds were first quoted on 25 April 2002.
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by the prevailing side of the market. Thus, by investigating close-to-close spot returns
rather than intraday price changes, we largely exclude the potentially decreasing effect
of price variation limits on stock market volatility. Moreover, most studies find price
variation limits to merely delay price adjustments to the next trading day, thereby
transferring stock return volatility to the following day (Kim and Rhee (1997), Henke
and Voronkova (2005)). Regarding price variation limits for futures and options, the
empirical results are largely unaffected by these since we base our analysis on stock
returns rather than derivatives prices.
More relevant to our research questions is the unique investor structure on the Polish
derivatives market. On the futures and options markets, individual investors are the
dominating trader type, accounting for about 75% of turnover value on average over
the past eight years, with domestic institutions contributing 20%, while the remaining
5% were allocated to foreign investors. This dominance of individual investors is due to
three factors: First, small transactions can be settled at the Polish derivatives market.
For example, the value of an index futures contract equals the product of the multiplier
and the price of the underlying. The former was set to only 10 zl, which currently
equals about 2.75 US$. This small multiplier makes WIG20 index futures affordable
for small investors. Second, individual investors who wish to trade on the Polish
futures market can easily register to do so without formal barriers. Third, institutional
investors such as Polish pension funds or mutual funds are not permitted to trade
in derivatives. Interestingly, the fraction of turnover value attributed to individuals
on the derivatives market is about twice as large as their share on the spot market.
The share of cash market trading volume originating from foreign investors, domestic
institutional investors, and domestic individual investors is about one third each.
5.3 Methodology and Data
In order to empirically investigate the impact of the introduction of futures and op-
tions on stock market volatility we rely on the asymmetric GARCH model proposed by
Glosten et al. (1993) (GJR-GARCH). Its mean equation takes into account first-order
autocorrelation in stock returns, a structural change in the autoregressive structure
after the introduction of futures or options, international interdependence of the Pol-
ish stock market, and a day-of-the-week-effect. Specifically, we estimate the mean
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equation:
rt = α0 + α1rt−1 + α2Dtrt−1 + α3r
f
t−1 +
7∑
i=4
αiDoWit + t . (12)
The daily spot return is defined as the logarithmic difference rt = ln(Pt) − ln(Pt−1),
and t = N(0, ht) denotes the unpredictable component of spot returns. With the
dummy variable Dt we model the structural change induced by the introduction of
futures or options on the Polish stock market at time τ . Dt takes the value of zero up
until futures or options are launched (and after their suspension) and the value of one
from the day after their introduction onwards. A statistically significant coefficient α2
indicates a structural change in the autocorrelation pattern of stock returns after τ .
In particular, while α1 measures the extent of autocorrelation during the period before
the introduction of futures and options, the sum (α1 +α2) provides an autocorrelation
measure for the period afterwards. rft−1 denotes the lagged logarithmic return on a
foreign stock market index. Finally,
∑7
i=4DoWit are dummy variables for Tuesday,
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.
In the volatility equation of the GJR-GARCH model, positive and negative shocks
can have different effects on subsequent volatility:
ht = (1 + γDDt)(γ0 + γ1ht−1 + γ22t−1 + γ3
2
t−1It) , (13)
where It takes on the value of zero when the return innovation is zero or positive, i.e.
t−1 ≥ 0, and the value of one in case of negative return shocks, i.e. t−1 < 0. This is a
parsimonious model specification with only one lagged term of ht and 
2
t . A statistically
significant and positive γ3 coefficient indicates that negative return shocks increase the
conditional variance more strongly than positive return shocks. Setting the asymmetry
coefficient γ3 equal to zero yields the conventional GARCH(1,1) specification as a
special case of the GJR-GARCH model.
Relevant to the first research question about the impact of the introduction of
derivatives on spot market volatility is the estimated parameter γˆD on the multiplicative
dummy variable Dt, which captures the differences in volatility between the time before
the introduction of derivatives contracts and thereafter. This coefficient provides, thus,
a measure of the shift in the conditional volatility process. A statistically significant
and positive γˆD parameter suggests that the spot market volatility is higher after the
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introduction of derivatives contracts than before, thereby providing evidence in favour
of the destabilising hypothesis. If γˆD is statistically significant but negative, futures or
options exhibit a dampening influence on volatility.
In order to answer the second research question regarding changes in the asymmetric
pattern of the impact of positive and negative return shocks on conditional volatility,
we estimate the volatility equation (2) in a different specification:
ht = (1 + ζDDt)(ζ0 + ζ1ht−1 + ζ22t−1) + ζ3
2
t−1It + ζ4Dt
2
t−1It , (14)
where ζ4 captures differences in the volatility response to negative return shocks be-
tween before the introduction of derivatives and thereafter. ζ3 measures the impact of
negative return shocks before the introduction of derivatives (and after their suspen-
sion), whereas the influence of negative return shocks after the launch of futures or
options equals ζ3 + ζ4. A statistically significant negative (positive) ζ4 parameter im-
plies that this asymmetry has decreased (increased) due to the introduction of futures
or options.
Other institutional changes and shocks to the Polish stock market such as interna-
tional financial crises and the collapse of the dotcom stock price bubble might have had
an effect on stock return volatility. To take into account this aspect and to answer the
third research question, two shorter sample periods than the original one are investi-
gated. The first one captures two calendar years around the introduction date, whereas
the second sample period includes a 12-month period before and after the event. The
broad spectrum of introduction dates in our dataset provides a further robustness check
against other factors potentially driving changes in spot market volatility.
Equations (1) and (2), and equations (1) and (3), are jointly estimated via maximum
likelihood using the Bernd et al. (1974) algorithm. p-values based on Bollerslev and
Wooldridge (1992) robust standard errors with six lags are reported. We present the
estimation results for the complete mean equation (1), and, as a robustness check,
excluding the four day-of-the-week dummy variables.
Our dataset, which was obtained from Datastream, comprises time series of daily
close price observations (Pt) on the WIG20, mWIG40, and TechWIG stock price in-
dexes as well as on the individual stocks listed in Table 12. The sample period starts
on 1 November 1994, which is the first complete month with five trading days per week,
and it ends on 29 July 2007. The TechWIG price index was introduced on 19 May
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2000 and back-calculated to 31 December 1999. We include in our sample TechWIG
data from 31 December 1999. For data availability reasons, the time series for Bank
Millenium only starts on 16 July 1996. Options on individual stocks were introduced
on 17 October 2005, and futures on PKO BP were launched on 11 July 2005, resulting
in post-event time series too short to draw reliable conclusions. We therefore omit the
corresponding spot returns from the analysis. In order to control for international in-
fluence on the Polish stock market, we further include daily close prices of the S&P500
index in our dataset.
It can be argued that expiration day effects on the futures market raise stock market
volatility. However, Illueca and LaFuente (2006) show that the S&P500 spot return
volatility is not higher at the expiration date of the corresponding futures contracts.
Therefore we do not adjust the observed spot returns for potential expiration day effects
after the futures introduction dates.
5.4 Empirical Results
Table 13 presents the estimation results of the GJR-GARCH model for the full sample
period. While autocorrelation (α1) in stock indexes can be explained by time-varying
expected returns, non-synchronous trading, transaction costs, or feedback trading, se-
rial correlation in individual stocks could be indicative of market inefficiency. We
find return autocorrelation of order one for three individual stocks, the WIG20 in-
dex, and the mWIG40 index. The impact of the introduction of futures and options
on stock return autocorrelation is statistically insignificant (α2) for most underlying
instruments. However, for WIG20 futures and for WIG20 options, stock return au-
tocorrelation diminishes following the debut of these derivatives. This finding holds
also for the individual stock Bank Zachodni WBK. The reduction in stock return au-
tocorrelation can be viewed as evidence in favour of more efficient spot markets with
improved information flows once the derivatives markets are established. Holden and
Subrahmanyam (2002) show that sequential information acquisition leads to return
autocorrelation, implying that the reduction in serial correlation was at least partially
driven by improved information flows once derivatives started trading. Nevertheless,
the estimated α2 parameters for the mWIG40 index and the Elektrim stock are posi-
tive and significant. The Polish stock market is significantly positively correlated with
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the S&P500 market (α3), while the Polish cash market for most instruments under
investigation exhibits no day-of-the-week effect (α4 to α7).
When looking at the estimated coefficients describing the conditional volatility pro-
cess, we find that all estimated γ1 and γ2 are significant and show a high degree of
persistence. The results for the asymmetry coefficient γ3 are mixed. In most cases, the
estimated γ3 parameter is insignificant suggesting that positive and negative shocks
affect the conditional cash market volatility equally. This indicates that a simple
GARCH(1,1) specification sufficiently models the conditional volatility process. For
the TechWIG and for individual stocks, volatility is higher in periods of market de-
cline than during market upturns due to a positive and significant γ3 parameter. The
significant asymmetry in conditional variance following positive and negative return
innovations is consistent with Glosten et al. (1993).
Table 13 about here
Our primary goal is to determine the impact of futures and options trading on the
conditional volatility of the underlying instrument, which is measured by the coeffi-
cient γD. Surprisingly, for the vast majority of instruments, the introduction of futures
and options trading seems to stabilise spot returns, which is in contradiction to the
hypothesis that uninformed individual investors on the derivatives market introduce
noisy price signals into the cash market. This empirical finding is in accordance with
the results reported in Edwards (1988a) for the U.S., with the insights in Gulen and
Mayhew (2000) for most mature markets, and with the evidence of Raju and Karande
(2003) for India but is contrary to Bae et al. (2004)’s findings for Korea. Thus, indi-
viduals transacting on the Polish derivatives market appear as informed and rational
as institutional traders dominating mature futures markets. For only three out of
15 derivatives, their launches appear statistically insignificant (futures on the WIG20
index, on PKN Orlen, and on Bank Zachodni WBK).
Interestingly, the introduction of futures trading with the WIG20 stock price index
as underlying has no significant effect on the conditional volatility of the WIG20. This
is in accordance with Edwards (1988b) who reports the absence of significant changes in
Value Line index volatility following the introduction of such index futures. Around the
introduction date of WIG20 futures, individual investors were the most active trader
group on both cash and futures markets, resulting in comparatively low information
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differentials between spot and futures traders. It could be conjectured that the absence
of an effect of futures trading on spot market volatility results, in part, from this
setting. Later on, after 2000, the difference in investor structure between the cash and
futures markets grew, and thus the information differential between these two markets
increased. At that time, futures on the mWIG40, on the TechWIG, on individual
stocks as well as options on the WIG20 were introduced. Their debut stabilises the
corresponding spot returns, implying that the arrival of individual investors on the
derivatives market lead to improved information flows into the cash market. Again,
this result suggests that Polish individuals trading in derivatives are better informed
than the literature indicates for mature markets.
Next, as our second research question, we examine potential changes in asymmetry
in the spot market responses to positive and negative return shocks. A significantly
positive ζ4 coefficient shown in Table 14 indicates that negative return shocks increase
the conditional spot volatility after the introduction of derivatives more than before.
For futures on the TechWIG and on two individual stocks, this asymmetry in cash
market responses to positive and negative shocks has increased following the launch
of derivatives trading, while the spot market responses to such shocks for two other
individual stocks have become less asymmetric after their corresponding futures were
introduced. Whereas no significant change in asymmetry can be detected for the
WIG20 conditional volatility following the introduction of WIG20 futures, the launch
of WIG20 options reduces the asymmetric responses on the spot market to positive and
negative shocks. This is consistent with Antoniou et al. (1998) who find a statistically
significant reduction in the asymmetric response of spot market volatility following the
introduction of stock index futures in Germany, Japan, and the U.S.
Table 14 about here
Our third research question revolves around the coincidence between changes in
conditional spot market volatility and the introduction of derivatives. In order to
eliminate the effect of other events near the launch dates of the derivatives, we present
in Table 15 estimation results based on shorter samples for the shift γD in conditional
spot market volatility following the launch of derivatives.10
10In addition, we shrink the sample period around the suspension dates for futures on Elektrim,
Bank BPH, and Bank Millenium. For the former, the effect of the suspension on conditional volatility
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Table 15 about here
Overall, the findings reported in Table 13 are confirmed. Moreover, the introduction
dates of derivatives examined in this paper range from January 1998 to July 2005. The
empirical results are consistent across this 7-year period, providing a further robust-
ness check against other factors potentially driving changes in spot market volatility.
Interestingly, while the impact of trading in WIG20 futures on conditional WIG20
volatility is insignificant across the entire sample period, the introduction of WIG20
futures appears to raise the corresponding conditional spot market volatility in the
shorter sample. Launched in January 1998, this futures contract was the first deriva-
tives instrument at the WSE. It can be conjectured that individual investors trading in
financial products as complex as derivatives contracts had to learn profitable trading
strategies in the first months after their introduction. During this learning process,
unreliable price signals were conveyed to the cash market, resulting in a temporarily
destabilised spot market.
In essence, we investigate the impact of the introduction of derivatives trading on
the conditional volatility of the underlying cash market. Since the Polish derivatives
market is dominated by individual investors, we hypothesise that derivatives traders
are uninformed relative to spot market traders. Consistently with this view, deriva-
tives trading should have increased spot market volatility. However, the introduc-
tion of futures and options has stabilised the underlying cash market, implying that
the individuals transacting on the Polish derivatives market are better informed than
the literature on individual investors’ trading behaviour suggests for mature markets.
While the empirical results regarding changes in asymmetry in cash market responses
to positive and negative return shocks are ambiguous, the WIG20 stock index volatility
becomes less asymmetric after WIG20 options are launched. This is further evidence
supporting the favourable influence of individuals trading in derivatives on the cash
market.
is insignificant, while the maximisation procedure for the latter two shares does not converge. This is
likely to be due to the small number of observations since the recent suspension date.
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5.5 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of derivatives
trading in Poland on the conditional return volatility of the underlyings. This impact
primarily depends on how well informed futures and options traders are relative to
investors transacting on the corresponding spot market. Since the Polish derivatives
market is dominated by individuals, we expect a destabilising effect on the spot mar-
ket (Dennis and Weston (2001), Figlewski (1981)). However, derivatives trading has
a stabilising effect on the Polish stock market, implying that Polish individuals trans-
acting in derivatives are better informed and more rational traders than the literature
suggests for individuals on mature markets. The introduction of futures and options
trading therefore leads to better information flows into the cash market and hence to a
more efficient spot market. This evidence does not justify the regulation of derivatives
trading in order to stabilise the cash market.
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5.6 Tables
Table 12: Overview of the Polish Futures and Options Markets
Name Listing of
underlying spot
Introduction of
derivatives contract
Trading suspended
Futures
WIG20 16 April 1994 16 January 1998 −
mWIG40 21 September 1998 18 February 2002 −
TechWIG 19 May 2000 1 August 2000 −
Telekomunikacja Polska 18 November 1998 22 January 2001 −
PKN Orlen 26 November 1999 22 January 2001 −
Elektrim 26 March 1992 22 January 2001 17 November 2003
Bank Pekao 30 June 1998 22 October 2001 −
KGHM Polska Miedz 18 July 1997 22 October 2001 −
Bre Bank 26 September 1996 22 October 2001 −
Agora 20 April 1999 22 October 2001 −
Prokom Software 20 April 1998 22 October 2001 −
Bank BPH 16 September 1996 18 March 2002 5 July 2006
Bank Millenium 13 August 1992 24 March 2003 5 July 2006
Bank Zachodni WBK 2 July 2001 24 March 2003 −
PKO BP 9 November 2004 11 July 2005 −
Options
WIG20 16 April 1994 22 September 2003 −
PKN Orlen 26 November 1999 17 October 2005 −
Bank Pekao 30 June 1998 17 October 2005 −
Telekomunikacja Polska 18 November 1998 17 October 2005 −
KGHM Polska Miedz 18 July 1997 17 October 2005 −
Prokom Software 20 April 1998 17 October 2005 −
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Table 13: Estimation Results for Mean and Volatility Equations
Name of underlying Regression coefficients (p-values)
rt = α0 + α1rt−1 + α2Dtrt−1 + α3rft−1 +
∑7
i=4 αiDoWit + t ht = (1 + γDDt)(γ0 + γ1ht−1 + γ2
2
t−1 + γ3
2
t−1It)
α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 γD γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3
Panel A: Futures
WIG20 0.137 0.199 −0.180 0.451 −0.214 −0.232 −0.046 0.011 −0.005 0.081 0.878 0.091 0.018
(0.019)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.559) (0.880) (0.378) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.185)
0.039 0.202 −0.183 0.449 − − − − −0.005 0.079 0.880 0.090 0.015
(0.152) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.364) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.236)
mWIG40 0.048 0.081 0.077 0.196 −0.053 −0.043 0.055 0.100 −0.011 0.017 0.888 0.122 −0.022
(0.265) (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.052)∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.350) (0.451) (0.297) (0.075)∗ (0.042)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗
0.062 0.084 0.072 0.197 − − − − −0.012 0.018 0.884 0.127 −0.025
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.044)∗∗
TechWIG 0.249 0.170 −0.138 0.278 −0.455 −0.319 −0.100 −0.024 −0.106 0.306 0.815 0.169 0.075
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.187) (0.294) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.300) (0.838) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
0.062 0.169 −0.139 0.281 − − − − −0.104 0.310 0.816 0.172 0.061
(0.125) (0.195) (0.298) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.029)∗∗
Telekomunikacja Polska 0.148 0.005 −0.038 0.307 −0.283 −0.185 −0.053 −0.046 −0.015 0.113 0.921 0.066 0.008
(0.117) (0.885) (0.371) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗ (0.168) (0.700) (0.722) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.578)
0.035 0.005 −0.037 0.306 − − − − −0.015 0.112 0.923 0.065 0.006
(0.439) (0.878) (0.375) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.668)
PKN Orlen 0.127 −0.001 −0.000 0.246 −0.178 −0.100 −0.096 0.061 0.004 0.535 0.778 0.060 0.024
(0.179) (0.982) (0.999) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.208) (0.478) (0.440) (0.633) (0.837) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.285)
0.063 −0.001 −0.001 0.247 − − − − 0.007 0.555 0.770 0.061 0.022
(0.116) (0.991) (0.987) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.755) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.324)
Elektrim −0.090 0.032 0.091 0.317 0.239 0.053 0.118 0.208 −0.007 0.328 0.929 0.048 0.034
(0.515) (0.097)∗ (0.024)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.253) (0.791) (0.550) (0.304) (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
0.034 0.032 0.090 0.315 − − − − −0.007 0.323 0.930 0.047 0.033
(0.605) (0.098)∗ (0.023)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Bank Pekao 0.232 −0.055 0.005 0.349 −0.281 −0.292 −0.097 −0.135 −0.035 0.610 0.758 0.129 0.005
(0.012)∗∗ (0.062)∗ (0.902) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗ (0.465) (0.274) (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.856)
0.072 −0.054 0.004 0.348 − − − − −0.033 0.593 0.762 0.127 0.006
(0.086)∗ (0.066)∗ (0.931) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.811)
KGHM Polska Miedz 0.089 0.017 0.010 0.374 −0.150 −0.241 0.013 0.134 −0.017 0.359 0.878 0.071 0.035
(0.461) (0.566) (0.801) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.400) (0.137) (0.928) (0.357) (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗
0.037 0.020 0.007 0.369 − − − − −0.018 0.378 0.873 0.074 0.033
(0.479) (0.496) (0.863) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.035)∗∗
Bre Bank 0.116 −0.007 0.055 0.332 −0.031 −0.138 −0.043 −0.021 −0.023 0.153 0.928 0.040 0.033
(0.209) (0.771) (0.155) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.815) (0.291) (0.734) (0.861) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
0.068 −0.007 0.054 0.332 − − − − −0.022 0.151 0.929 0.040 0.033
(0.101) (0.793) (0.164) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Agora −0.109 0.038 0.037 0.249 −0.048 0.067 0.293 0.176 −0.018 0.160 0.892 0.092 0.003
(0.229) (0.233) (0.365) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.708) (0.615) (0.021)∗∗ (0.209) (0.028)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.839)
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Table 13 (continued): Estimation Results for Mean and Volatility Equations
Name of underlying Regression coefficients (p-values)
rt = α0 + α1rt−1 + α2Dtrt−1 + α3rft−1 +
∑7
i=4 αiDoWit + t ht = (1 + γDDt)(γ0 + γ1ht−1 + γ2
2
t−1 + γ3
2
t−1It)
α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 γD γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3
−0.011 0.041 0.035 0.252 − − − − −0.017 0.153 0.894 0.090 0.003
(0.804) (0.196) (0.389) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.844)
Prokom Software 0.218 −0.020 0.039 0.341 −0.374 −0.431 −0.167 0.018 −0.038 0.303 0.887 0.094 −0.008
(0.048)∗∗ (0.606) (0.410) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.282) (0.905) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.613)
0.021 −0.016 0.037 0.340 − − − − −0.041 0.329 0.884 0.095 −0.010
(0.683) (0.688) (0.439) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.554)
Bank BPH 0.081 −0.014 0.022 0.285 −0.107 −0.169 0.123 0.019 −0.105 0.849 0.774 0.071 0.078
(0.391) (0.615) (0.569) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.433) (0.209) (0.310) (0.889) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
0.053 −0.013 0.018 0.287 − − − − −0.106 0.856 0.773 0.074 0.075
(0.214) (0.647) (0.639) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Bank Millenium 0.165 0.014 0.022 0.211 −0.150 −0.255 −0.090 0.052 −0.125 1.196 0.758 0.136 0.026
(0.152) (0.654) (0.630) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.305) (0.133) (0.585) (0.717) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.130)
0.076 0.016 0.018 0.211 − − − − −0.125 1.200 0.759 0.135 0.025
(0.180) (0.610) (0.691) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.140)
Bank Zachodni WBK 0.247 0.099 −0.094 0.206 −0.095 −0.365 −0.109 0.039 −0.003 0.203 0.872 0.093 −0.015
(0.034)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.555) (0.020)∗∗ (0.520) (0.779) (0.716) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.554)
0.141 0.100 −0.095 0.209 − − − − −0.004 0.229 0.862 0.097 −0.015
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.048)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.716) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.553)
Panel B: Options
WIG20 0.146 0.087 −0.069 0.446 −0.221 −0.238 −0.049 0.001 −0.027 0.107 0.872 0.089 0.018
(0.013)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.529) (0.987) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.211)
0.043 0.089 −0.075 0.444 − − − − −0.026 0.105 0.875 0.088 0.015
(0.117) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.272)
Notes: The sample period starts on 1 November 1994, which is the first complete month with five trading days per week, and it ends on 29 July 2007. See table 1 for an overview of
listing dates of stock market indices and individual stocks after 1 November 1994. For data availability reasons, the time series for Bank Millenium only starts on 16 July 1996. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 14: Estimation Results of Asymmetric Effects
Name of underlying Regression coefficients (p-values)
ht = (1 + ζDDt)(ζ0 + ζ1ht−1 + ζ22t−1) + ζ3
2
t−1It + ζ4Dt
2
t−1It
ζD ζ0 ζ1 ζ2 ζ3 ζ4
Panel A: Futures
WIG20 0.008 0.075 0.875 0.089 0.036 −0.031
(0.489) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.113) (0.247)
mWIG40 −0.003 0.017 0.881 0.126 −0.013 −0.022
(0.807) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.515) (0.326)
TechWIG −0.167 0.354 0.862 0.183 −0.122 0.202
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.122) (0.012)∗∗
Telekomunikacja Polska −0.043 0.150 0.931 0.066 −0.032 0.064
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
PKN Orlen 0.014 0.556 0.764 0.061 0.037 −0.017
(0.746) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.701) (0.861)
Elektrim −0.154 0.213 0.950 0.050 −0.015 0.470
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Bank Pekao 0.024 0.557 0.747 0.119 0.086 −0.148
(0.173) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
KGHM Polska Miedz 0.046 0.291 0.853 0.069 0.123 −0.150
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Bre Bank −0.013 0.148 0.926 0.039 0.042 −0.023
(0.093)∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.151)
Agora −0.003 0.145 0.887 0.090 0.024 −0.034
(0.832) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.289) (0.225)
Prokom Software −0.046 0.330 0.887 0.094 −0.016 0.013
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.416) (0.656)
Bank BPH −0.112 0.861 0.774 0.074 0.068 0.009
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.772)
Bank Millenium −0.113 1.180 0.760 0.133 0.033 −0.037
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.097)∗ (0.158)
Bank Zachodni WBK 0.035 0.093 0.893 0.080 0.030 −0.088
(0.018)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.331) (0.006)
Panel B: Options
WIG20 −0.008 0.095 0.875 0.087 0.024 −0.042
(0.486) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.130) (0.072)∗
Notes: The estimated mean equation without day-of-the-week dummies is rt = α0 + α1rt−1 +
α2Dtrt−1 + α3rft−1 + t. The sample period starts on 1 November 1994, which is the first complete
month with five trading days per week, and it ends on 29 July 2007. See table 1 for an overview of
listing dates of stock market indices and individual stocks after 1 November 1994. For data availability
reasons, the time series for Bank Millenium only starts on 16 July 1996. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 15: Estimation Results for shorter sample periods
Name of underlying Sample period γD (p-value)
Panel A: Futures
WIG20 1996:01:02 - 2000:12:19 0.054 (0.033)∗∗
1997:01:02 - 1999:01:29 0.197 (0.034)∗∗
mWIG40 2000:01:03 - 2004:12:31 −0.037 (0.034)∗∗
2001:02:01 - 2003:02:28 −0.166 (0.007)∗∗∗
TechWIG 2000:05:19 - 2002:12:31 −0.210 (0.000)∗∗
2000:05:19 - 2003:02:28 −0.277 (0.001)∗∗∗
Telekomunikacja Polska 1999:01:04 - 2003:12:31 −0.101 (0.002)∗∗∗
2000:01:03 - 2002:01:31 −0.060 (0.757)
PKN Orlen 1999:11:29 - 2003:12:31 0.004 (0.938)
2000:01:03 - 2002:01:31 0.224 (0.206)
Elektrim 1999:01:04 - 2003:12:31 0.035 (0.004)∗∗∗
2000:01:03 - 2002:01:31 0.038 (0.175)
Bank Pekao 1999:01:04 - 2003:12:31 −0.088 (0.071)∗
2000:10:02 - 2002:10:31 0.006 (0.926)
KGHM Polska Miedz 1999:01:04 - 2003:12:31 −0.011 (0.343)
2000:10:02 - 2002:10:31 −0.003 (0.852)
Bre Bank 1999:01:04 - 2003:12:31 −0.206 (0.000)∗∗∗
2000:10:02 - 2002:10:31 0.234 (0.314)
Agora 1999:04:21 - 2003:12:31 −0.044 (0.050)∗∗
2000:10:02 - 2002:10:31 −0.113 (0.042)∗∗
Prokom Software 1999:01:04 - 2003:12:31 −0.141 (0.000)∗∗∗
2000:10:02 - 2002:10:31 −0.064 (0.084)∗
Bank BPH 2000:01:03 - 2004:12:31 −0.061 (0.020)∗∗
2001:03:01 - 2003:03:31 −0.116 (0.177)
Bank Millenium 2001:01:02 - 2005:12:30 −0.240 (0.000)∗∗∗
2001:03:01 - 2004:03:31 0.034 (0.618)
Bank Zachodni WBK 2001:07:03 - 2005:12:30 −0.081 (0.035)∗∗
2002:03:01 - 2004:03:31 0.025 (0.506)
Panel B: Options
WIG20 2001:01:02 - 2005:12:30 −0.052 (0.000)∗∗∗
2002:09:02 - 2004:09:30 −0.010 (0.023)∗∗
Notes: The estimated mean equation without day-of-the-week dum-
mies is rt = α0 + α1rt−1 + α2Dtrt−1 + α3r
f
t−1 + t and the estimated
conditional variance equation is ht = (1+γDDt)(γ0+γ1ht−1+γ22t−1+
γ3
2
t−1It).
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis is to contribute empirical evidence on individual investors’ trad-
ing behaviour. It is often asserted that individuals are less well informed than in-
stitutions, and that individuals’ investment decisions are more sentiment-driven than
institutions’ trading activities. This investigation starts with an analysis of the market
microstructure of the anonymous electronic trading platform Xetra compared with the
non-anonymous floor trading at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The main conclusion of
this chapter is that uninformed individuals find more favourable trading conditions on
a non-anonymous platform, while the anonymous system offers a more advantageous
environment for informed trading. It is therefore argued against closing floor trading
systems. If the floor has already been abolished, the electronic exchange benefits from
a non-anonymous broker-facilitated upstairs market.
The remainder of this thesis investigates the extent to which individual investors
are informed, and whether their trading activities tend to be driven by behavioural
aspects. As a testing ground, the Polish stock and derivatives markets are chosen,
because individuals can be separated from institutions there. In the third chapter, the
presence of herding during up- and downswings on the Polish stock market is tested,
and significant herd behaviour by individuals is found in market downturns, while
institutions do not appear to engage in herding regardless of the state of the market.
If individuals are generally uninformed, it is rational for them to follow the market
rather than their own prior beliefs which are likely unreliable. However, it is hard to
maintain this argument considering the difference in herd behaviour between periods
of market stress and bullish phases.
By contrast, the following chapter testing for the presence of the Monday and
January effects on the Polish futures market suggests that individuals are better than
their reputation. The Polish futures market, which is dominated by individuals, shows
no sign of a Monday effect. Furthermore, the calendar month effect that we detect is
associated with the delivery cycle and hence does not constitute an anomaly.
Moreover, the final chapter concludes that individuals trading in Polish derivatives
are better informed than the literature on individual investors’ trading behaviour on
mature markets suggests. The introduction of futures and options trading at the War-
saw Stock Exchange had a stabilising effect on the underlying spot market. If futures
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traders are better informed than cash market participants, the launch of derivatives
improves the information flow into the underlying spot market and thus raises market
efficiency there.
In summary, the empirical evidence regarding individual investors’ trading be-
haviour is mixed. The absence of the Monday and January anomalies on the Polish
futures market suggests that individuals transacting there are as mature as institu-
tional investors. Moreover, we find evidence of informed and rational individuals when
investigating the effect of derivatives trading on conditional spot market volatility.
However, individual investors’ trading behaviour exhibits herding during periods of
market stress. Considering that the Polish stock market only re-opened in 1991 and
has been a rapidly growing emerging market, it is not surprising that individuals have
had to gain experience with complex financial products. As market participants learn,
and as trading behaviour and anomalies receive attention in the academic literature,
market efficiency is further promoted.
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